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DIGITAL SEARCHES, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND 
THE MAGISTRATES’ REVOLT 
Emily Berman* 
ABSTRACT 
Searches of electronically stored information present a Fourth Amendment 
challenge. It is often impossible for investigators to identify and collect, at the 
time a warrant is executed, only the specific data whose seizure is authorized. 
Instead, the government must seize the entire storage medium—e.g., a hard drive 
or a cell phone—and extract responsive information later. But investigators 
conducting that subsequent search inevitably will encounter vast amounts of 
non-responsive (and often intensely personal) information contained on the 
device. The challenge thus becomes how to balance the resulting privacy 
concerns with law enforcement’s legitimate need to investigate crime. Some 
magistrate judges have begun including in their warrants for digital searches 
limits on how those searches may be carried out—a development that some have 
referred to as a “magistrates’ revolt,” and which has both supporters and 
detractors. This Article argues that the magistrates’ “revolt” was actually no 
revolt at all. Instead, these judges simply adopted a time-honored tool—
minimization—that is used to address a conceptually analogous privacy threat 
posed by foreign intelligence collection. This Article further argues that 
embracing both the practice and the label of “minimization” will yield at least 
two benefits: First, it will recast magistrates’ actions as a new instantiation of a 
legitimate judicial role, rather than a novel, potentially illegitimate practice. 
Second, it will allow magistrates to draw on lessons learned from the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court’s creative use of minimization to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights in the intelligence-collection context. 
  
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. Thanks go to participants in the “Courts 
at War” Conference at the University of Texas Law School, D. Theodore Rave, David Kwok, Dave Fagundes, 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 1967 Supreme Court case Berger v. New York, Justice Clark wrote 
that, “law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not kept pace with 
. . . advances in scientific knowledge.”1 In the half-century since he wrote those 
words, the gap between technological advancement and the legal regime has 
only grown wider. The pace of technological change has accelerated. The role 
of technology in Americans’ daily lives has swelled. Yet even in this twenty-
first century world, the speed at which legal change moves remains much as it 
has been since the eighteenth century.  
When it comes to the Fourth Amendment—which protects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures of our “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects”—this sluggish pace has proved particularly problematic.2 The 
information age has generated an avalanche of Fourth Amendment-law 
dilemmas3—whether the same rules that apply to searching suitcases at the 
border apply to a traveler’s laptop computer;4 whether mapping an individual’s 
life 24/7 for days on end using cell phone location records requires a warrant;5 
whether the results of predictive algorithms generated using massive databases 
can form the basis of reasonable suspicion;6 whether and how the warrant 
requirement’s exception for searches incident to arrest should apply to the 
contents of an arrestee’s cell phone.7 It is up to courts in the first instance to 
resolve these questions.8 
 
 1 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”). 
 3 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that 
“[d]ramatic technological change” creates legal uncertainty); United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 134 (2d 
Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Because the degree of privacy secured 
to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been impacted by the advance of technology, the challenge is to adapt 
traditional Fourth Amendment concepts to the Government’s modern, more sophisticated investigative tools.”); 
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 808 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies] 
(discussing impact of changing technologies on Fourth Amendment doctrine). 
 4 See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (D. Md. 2014) (answering in the affirmative).  
 5 See Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (U.S. June 22, 2018) (answering in the affirmative). 
 6 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 
376–88 (2015). 
 7 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477–78 (2014) (holding that the warrant exception for 
searches incident to arrest does not permit a search of a cellphone’s contents). 
 8 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40–41 (2001) (considering whether use of thermal 
imaging devices to scan a private home was a search requiring Fourth Amendment protection); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–53 (1967) (holding that placing an electronic listening device on a public telephone 
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Searches and seizures of electronic media, such as computers and smart 
phones, present judges with a particularly thorny example of this phenomenon. 
For a traditional analog search or seizure to pass Fourth Amendment muster, the 
government must (1) apply to a neutral magistrate for a search warrant, (2) 
satisfy that magistrate that there is probable cause to believe that the search will 
lead to evidence of a crime, and (3) identify with particularity the places to be 
searched and the evidence to be seized.9 The magistrate then memorializes that 
information in a warrant, which authorizes law enforcement officials to execute 
a search of those places and to seize that evidence. These rules are designed to 
constrain government discretion, ensuring both that law enforcement officials 
have sufficient justification for infringing on a citizen’s privacy and that the 
infringement is no more significant than necessary.10 
When it comes to digital evidence, however, it is often impossible at the time 
of seizure to locate and segregate data that is responsive to a warrant from the 
vast amount of non-responsive (and often intensely personal) data stored on the 
same device. Imagine, for example, that Harry is suspected of tax fraud, and law 
enforcement gets a warrant to seize tax-related documents from his home 
computer. While looking through Harry’s computer files for evidence of tax 
fraud, investigators are likely to come across quite a few non-tax-related files, 
which could be private items such as personal correspondence or detailed 
medical information. Similarly, investigators seeking evidence that a computer 
was used to view child pornography might discover (lawful) intimate 
photographs or an Internet search history suggesting a substance-abuse problem. 
In other words, the search might result in exactly the kind of intrusive search 
that warrants are supposed to prevent.11  
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was amended in 2009 to 
recognize the unique nature of digital searches and offers as a partial solution a 
two-step process.12 First, when it comes to digital searches, investigators may 
 
booth qualified as a search because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–65 (1928) (requiring a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area to 
trigger the Fourth Amendment), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); 
Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 494–525 
(2011) (providing examples of courts adjusting Fourth Amendment doctrine in response to technology to 
maintain the balance of power between would-be criminals and law enforcement). Arguably, Katz added to the 
Olmstead-era rules rather than replacing them. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–07 (2012) (holding 
that Katz was not intended to withdraw any of the protection that the Fourth Amendment provides to private 
property).  
 9 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979). 
 10 See infra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 12 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s note to 2009 amendment. 
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engage in an overbroad seizure, such as seizing an entire computer, rather than 
only those files that contain evidence described in the warrant.13 Then, 
investigators can subject the seized data to “a later review.”14 While this rule 
may ensure that law enforcement officers can perform a thorough seizure of 
evidence responsive to the warrant, it does not entirely solve the problem. 
Whenever the search ultimately takes place, investigators still must identify the 
evidence—tax returns, for example—and separate it from other non-responsive 
data, such as private letters. This raises the question of what limits, if any, should 
govern investigators’ access to or use of the non-responsive information it 
encounters—a question that Rule 41 declines to answer.15  
In an effort to fill this gap, a handful of magistrate judges took matters into 
their own hands in what has been described in some quarters as a “magistrates’ 
revolt.”16 The “revolt” consisted of a series of opinions issued by federal 
magistrates around the country that sought to balance the interests of 
investigators against suspects’ privacy rights by rejecting law enforcement’s 
warrant requests for digital evidence unless those requests included (sometimes 
detailed) ex ante restrictions on how the government would carry out the search, 
such as limiting how long the government could keep the hardware it seized, 
specifying how the government would conduct the search, or explaining what 
the government would do with information it uncovered that fell outside the 
scope of the warrant.17 The number of magistrates involved was not large, but 
the opinions had outsized effect, prompting a debate on the propriety of the 
practice. 
The magistrates’ approach has been championed by some commentators as 
an effective means of addressing the Fourth Amendment challenge posed by 
digital searches. Professor Paul Ohm argues, for example, that these types of 
 
 13 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B). 
 14 Id. 
 15 See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 16 See, e.g., Reid Day, Comment, Let the Magistrates Revolt: A Review of Search Warrant Applications 
for Electronic Information Possessed by Online Services, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 510–11 (2015); Patrick J. 
Cotter, Magistrates’ Revolt: Unexpected Resistance to Federal Government Efforts to Get “General Warrants” 
for Electronic Information, NAT’L L. REV. (May 15, 2014), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/magistrates-
revolt-unexpected-resistance-to-federal-government-efforts-to-get-genera; Scott H. Greenfield, The 
Magistrates’ Revolt Continues: Search Protocol, SIMPLE JUST.: A CRIM. DEF. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2015), http://blog. 
simplejustice.us/2015/02/25/the-magistrates-revolt-continues-search-protocol/; Ann E. Marimow & Craig 
Timberg, Low-Level Federal Judges Balking at Law Enforcement Requests for Electronic Evidence, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/low-level-federal-judges-balking-at-law-
enforcement-requests-for-electronic-evidence/2014/04/24/eec81748-c01b-11e3-b195-
dd0c1174052c_story.html. 
 17 See infra Section II.B. and accompanying notes.  
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restrictions “have become necessary; they are the only way the courts can fulfill 
their constitutional duty to protect privacy from government overreaching.”18 
The highly influential former Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski also contended 
that magistrates should include a series of ex ante instructions in the warrants 
for digital searches that they issue.19 Indeed, several magistrates’ orders 
considered part of the revolt used Judge Kozinski’s suggested framework as a 
blueprint.20 
Yet while it might seem like an elegant means to fill a gap in existing law, 
the practice has not been universally endorsed. Fourth Amendment expert 
Professor Orin Kerr has argued, for example, that memorializing ex ante rules 
for searches of electronic media is neither lawful nor normatively advisable.21 
Kerr and other opponents of the practice argue that it will result in excessive 
limitations on law enforcement officials, that necessary means of executing a 
digital search is unknowable ex ante, and that magistrates lack the expertise (and 
perhaps even the authority) to craft or oversee these types of restrictions.22 
 
 18 Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 1, 11–12 (2011) (arguing that Professor Kerr is incorrect when he asserts that magistrates lack the 
authority to impose ex ante rules and stating, without elaboration, that magistrates should engage in this 
practice); see also Lily R. Robinton, Courting Chaos: Conflicting Guidance from Courts Highlights the Need 
for Clearer Rules to Govern the Search and Seizure of Digital Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 311, 343–44 
(2010) (arguing that it would be unreasonable not to require investigators to employ “less intrusive, more 
effective search methods” where they exist); Derek Haynes, Comment, Search Protocols: Establishing the 
Protections Mandated by the Fourth Amendment Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures in the World of 
Electronic Evidence, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 757, 771–74 (2009) (arguing that search protocols are not meant 
to impose unreasonable conditions on searches, but simply to determine how to exclude “irrelevant information 
from the scope of the search”); Marc Palumbo, Note, How Safe Is Your Data?: Conceptualizing Hard Drives 
Under the Fourth Amendment, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 977, 999–1002 (2009) (arguing that technology exists 
that permits the government to engage in effective digital searches without “indiscriminately viewing everything 
on an individual’s computer”). 
 19 See infra note 76.  
 20 E.g., In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at Premises 
Controlled by Apple, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 21 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 1241, 
1246 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation] (arguing that ex ante restrictions are both unauthorized and 
unwise). 
 22 See id.; see also Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 545–
47, 575–76 (2005) [hereinafter Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World] (arguing that “it is more difficult 
to plan a computer search ex ante” because “the search procedures” are “more of an art than a science”) (italics 
added); Andrew Vahid Moshirnia, Note, Separating Hard Fact from Hard Drive: A Solution for Plain View 
Doctrine in the Digital Domain, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 624–25 (2010) (arguing that limiting government 
search techniques “invites gaming” by bad actors); Bryan K. Weir, Note, It’s (Not So) Plain to See: The Circuit 
Split on the Plain View Doctrine in Digital Searches, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 83, 108–10 (2010) 
(arguing it is impossible to know in advance what methods will be necessary because the investigator, like the 
doctor “may not know how best to proceed until he opens up the patient and takes a look”). 
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This Article contends that the true significance of this revolt has eluded both 
supporters and opponents. Neither appreciate that the magistrates’ “revolt” was 
no revolt at all. Instead, these judges—whether consciously or unconsciously—
have simply adapted to the digital search context a decades-old tool designed to 
resolve exactly the sort of privacy concerns that digital searches raise: 
“minimization.”23 Minimization procedures, whose specifics will vary from 
context to context, are procedural protections that judges may impose on 
searches and seizures when the investigative technique being authorized poses a 
significant privacy threat.24 This Article contends that a brief look at the history 
of minimization procedures reveals that what some magistrates have been 
doing—the so-called revolt—is exactly the same thing that Congress has 
statutorily required in other contexts for decades.25 It further argues that these 
judges should not only embrace the practice of imposing ex ante limits on digital 
searches but also recognize those limits for what they are—minimization 
procedures. 
The most instructive, creative, and flexible use of minimization 
procedures—and thus the most useful model for magistrates—has come from 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court). The FISA Court is a 
federal court created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA) to review government applications to engage in domestic surveillance 
for foreign intelligence purposes.26 For the first three decades of its existence, 
the Court operated much like a magistrate judge evaluating requests for search 
warrants—determining (in secret and ex parte) whether government applications 
 
 23 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012) (defining minimization procedures as procedures “reasonably designed 
in light of the purpose and technique” of the information collection “to minimize the acquisition and retention, 
and prohibit the dissemination,” of private information). Minimization is statutorily required in multiple 
contexts. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2012) (criminal wiretaps); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (electronic 
communications for foreign intelligence purposes); 50 U.S.C. § 1821(4) (2012) (physical searches for foreign 
intelligence purposes); The USA Freedom Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 104(a)(3)(A), 129 Stat. 268, 272 
(2015) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)(1) (2015)) (communications metadata). 
 24 Anyone who watched the HBO series The Wire is already familiar with basic minimization procedures. 
When monitoring the communications of the Barksdale drug organization, members of the Major Crimes Unit 
listened to and recorded all conversations related to the illicit drug trade. But upon hearing a conversation with 
a clearly non-criminal purpose—someone making plans to attend church services with family members, for 
example—the police stopped recording. That is minimization. Since a wiretap warrant only authorizes law 
enforcement to collect communications that constitute evidence of a crime, refraining from recording non-crime-
related communications minimizes (or prevents) collection of material beyond the scope of the warrant. See The 
Wire: The Wire, Season 1, Episode 6 (HBO television broadcast July 7, 2002). For a discussion of other forms 
of minimization, see Section II.B.  
 25 See infra Section II.B.2. (discussing examples of the FISA Court’s minimization procedures). 
 26 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2012) (establishing an Article III court to review and approve government 
applications for authorization to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes inside the 
United States). 
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for surveillance authority should be approved.27 Since 9/11, however, the 
intelligence community’s ever-expanding surveillance powers have driven a 
correspondingly expanded role for the FISA Court. As the scope of government 
authority grew, so too did the means by which the FISA Court sought to 
constrain that authority within constitutional and statutory limits.28 The result 
was the development of a collection of minimization procedures now available 
for magistrates to tap. 
Magistrates’ characterization of ex ante warrant limitations as “minimization 
procedures” would be more than a simple semantic shift. As an initial matter, it 
would help to refute the contention that engaging in the practice is beyond the 
scope of magistrate judges’ competence. Individual judges have always played 
a critical role in devising and overseeing the implementation of minimization 
procedures.29 Recognizing that these magistrates are merely continuing to 
perform this function will therefore recast their actions as a new instantiation of 
a recognized, legitimate judicial role, rather than a new, potentially illegitimate 
practice. In addition, once magistrates envision ex ante rules for digital searches 
as minimization procedures, they can draw on the FISA Court’s creative 
minimization jurisprudence. The FISA Court’s opinions and orders include a 
rich variety of forms that minimization can take.30 In addition, they demonstrate 
that minimization procedures can serve as effective, flexible tools with which to 
safeguard constitutional rights that are threatened by advances in the 
government’s technological capabilities.31 In short, they form part of the 
solution to the digital-search puzzle, and should be recognized as such. 
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I will set out in more detail the 
particular Fourth Amendment difficulty arising from searches of electronically 
stored information. Part II will first explain minimization procedures’ raison 
d’être: to safeguard individual rights when an information-collection technique 
risks mingling responsive and non-responsive information. It will then describe 
some of the innovative ways in which the FISA Court has used minimization 
procedures in pursuit of this goal. Finally, Part III will begin by offering insights 
 
 27 See infra Section II.B.2. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See infra notes 106–109 and accompanying text. Usually, these judges are enforcing statutory 
requirements to minimize, but the FISA Court has also imposed minimization procedures in contexts where 
there was no such mandate. See infra notes 158–163 and accompanying text.  
 30 See infra Section II.B.2. 
 31 See generally Emily Berman, Quasi-Constitutional Protections and Government Surveillance, 2016 
BYU L. REV. 771 (discussing in detail the array of minimization procedures employed by the FISA Court); 
Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 102 MINN. L. REV. 577 (2017) 
(same). 
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into what the idea of minimization has to offer traditional courts facing the 
challenges inherent in authorizing electronic searches and then will go on to 
rebut existing critiques of the practice on both normative and doctrinal grounds.  
I. DIGITAL SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT  
This Part will limn the contours of the Fourth Amendment dilemma that 
searches of digital storage presents. It will begin in section A by detailing the 
ways in which digital searches challenge existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
Section B will then explain how a few magistrate judges sought to address this 
challenge.  
A. Digital Searches and the Fourth Amendment 
This dilemma arises because the nature of digital evidence requires 
investigators to seize entire storage devices and search them for evidence later—
a practice that poses significant threats to privacy—rather than seizing only 
evidence of criminality from the outset. Two differences between digital and 
analog evidence necessitate this “seize first, search later” approach. First, 
evidence of criminal activity will inevitably be mingled with irrelevant data. And 
due to the sheer size of digital devices’ storage capacity, the volume of irrelevant 
data on any given device will be significant.32 This means that any digital storage 
medium seized because it contains evidence of criminality will also include vast 
amounts of innocent, potentially intimate data, raising serious privacy concerns. 
A search of a cell phone’s text messages might reveal not only communications 
between co-conspirators but also private text messages unrelated to the crime. 
The same is true of other forms of data as well, such as Internet search histories 
that reveal queries about health symptoms, addiction treatment, or family 
planning options.33 Indeed, according to the Supreme Court, “a cell phone search 
would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive 
search of a house.”34 And if the digital evidence at issue is a hard drive that stores 
information about multiple individuals—an accountant’s records, a Gmail 
server, or a drug testing lab’s files—then the privacy of “countless individuals 
 
 32 See Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use Restrictions on 
Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) [Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence] (“[A] 
law enforcement search for digital evidence requires searching for a needle in an enormous electronic 
haystack.”). 
 33 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). 
 34 Id. at 2491 (italics omitted). 
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not implicated in any criminal activity, who might not even know that the 
information about them has been seized” is also at risk.35  
Second, digital evidence differs from other forms of evidence because its 
nature as contraband is not always immediately evident. This complicates efforts 
to segregate digital evidence from non-responsive information. Data on digital 
storage devices “may be concealed, compressed, erased or booby-trapped” in 
ways that make it impossible to discover without accessing large numbers of 
non-responsive files.36 And while criminals might seek to hide physical evidence 
as well—for example by stashing illicit drugs in containers with innocuous 
labels, such as “Sally’s Legos”—there are only so many places such evidence 
can be hidden. Law enforcement may not, as the saying goes, look inside a 
matchbox if they are authorized to seize an elephant.37 When it comes to digital 
evidence, contraband is more difficult to identify using only a cursory search. 
These differences mean that it is not feasible to require law enforcement to 
sift through all of that information for responsive data at the time of the initial 
search and seize only responsive information at the point of collection38—as 
Rule 41 acknowledges, “over-seizing is an inherent part” of digital evidence 
collection.39 Moreover, large volumes of information on each digital device 
means that the over-collection will be significant, raising significant privacy 
concerns.40 Yet to ensure effective searches, the government must be authorized 
to engage in this over-seizure at the outset and then examine the seized devices’ 
contents later, usually at a law enforcement facility and often through advanced 
forensic methods performed by a computer specialist.41  
 
 35 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 36 See, e.g., id. at 1170–71; United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Forcing police to 
limit their searches to files that the suspect has labeled in a particular way would be much like saying police may 
not seize a plastic bag containing a powdery white substance if it is labeled ‘flour’ . . . .”). 
 37 See Wilkerson v. State, 594 A.2d 597, 605 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (“The permitted scope of a 
search is, logically, whatever is necessary to serve the purpose of that particular search, but ‘[d]on’t look for an 
elephant in a matchbox.’”). 
 38 Hill, 459 F.3d at 974–75 (endorsing the district court’s reasoning that “the process of searching the 
files at the scene can take a long time. To be certain that the medium in question does not contain any seizable 
material, the officers would have to examine every one of what may be thousands of files on a disk—a process 
that could take many hours and perhaps days.”). 
 39 Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d at 1177; see also id. at 1180 (Kozinski, J., concurring) 
(“Nothing any appellate court could say, however, would substitute for the sound judgment that magistrate 
judges must . . . exercise in striking this delicate balance.”). 
 40 See, e.g., United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Because electronic devices 
could contain vast quantities of intermingled information, raising the risks inherent in over-seizing data, law 
enforcement and judicial officers must be especially cognizant of privacy risks when drafting and executing 
search warrants for electronic evidence.” (citation omitted)). 
 41 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41; Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 21, at 1248. 
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While this two-step process resolves the problem regarding inability to 
segregate responsive information at the time of collection, it simply kicks the 
Fourth Amendment can down the road. Having seized an entire digital storage 
device, investigators will still need to decide how to segregate the needles of 
evidence buried in a haystack of information that is not responsive to the 
warrant—a question Rule 41 does not address. In fact, the Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically noted that the amended Rule 41 
“does not address the specificity of description that the Fourth Amendment may 
require in a warrant for electronically stored information, leaving the application 
of this and other constitutional standards concerning both the seizure and the 
search to ongoing case law development.”42 As one magistrate judge put it, 
digital searches are one area where “an observable gap has arisen between the 
well-established rules lower courts have and the ones they need.”43 
The “plain view doctrine,” which allows law enforcement to seize any 
evidence in plain view of any place they are lawfully permitted to be,44 ensures 
that the privacy consequences of permitting a digital search without limitations 
are problematic. According to this doctrine, if the police have a warrant to search 
a home for firearms used in a robbery and see drugs sitting on a table upon 
entering the house, for example, those drugs may be seized as well. Imagine that 
officers seeking evidence of tax fraud come across email messages indicating 
that the suspect has enlisted a hitman to kill someone. Absent explicit 
restrictions, the suspect may now be charged not only with tax fraud, but also 
with attempted murder and solicitation. And while that example may not garner 
much sympathy for the suspect, who was, after all, soliciting murder, it 
represents a government intrusion into a private realm for which there was no 
probable cause and no warrant.  
Moreover, the government’s discovery of wholly legal conduct in the course 
of its search for contraband also can lead to real harm. Imagine that a high school 
principal is suspected of tax evasion and law enforcement obtains a warrant 
authorizing a search of his computer. On the computer, investigators discover 
emails that indicate the principal is having an extramarital affair, or that he has 
 
 42 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s note to 2009 amendment. 
 43 In re the Search of Cellular Tels. Within Evidence Facility Drug Enf’t Admin., Kan. City Dist. Office, 
No. 14-MJ-8017-DJW, 2014 WL 7793690, at *4 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Cellular Tels.]. 
 44 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464–66 (1971) (establishing the plain view doctrine); 
In re Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1173 (Vt. 2012) (“[W]hen law enforcement is 
conducting a search pursuant to a warrant, police are authorized to seize objects not listed in the warrant as long 
as the object is viewed from a lawful vantage point, the incriminating nature of the object is obvious, and it may 
be seized from a lawful right of access.” (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990))).  
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an enormous pornography collection. Though neither adultery nor possession of 
pornography is a crime, if such discoveries leak to the press or to his 
supervisors—or get posted on Twitter—there will likely be significant career-
related ramifications for the principal. Finally, there is the simple fact that none 
of us wants government officials rummaging through our private photos, 
documents, and communications. Even if there is nothing illegal or 
embarrassing among them, the Fourth Amendment denies the state unfettered 
access to our “persons, houses, papers, and effects” to protect our privacy.45 We 
should not be forced to relinquish that protection when it comes to digital 
material. 
Federal courts of appeals have responded to the digital implications of the 
plain view doctrine in different ways. Some courts simply continue to apply the 
traditional plain view doctrine to digital searches, holding that investigators are 
free to collect and use any digital contraband they happen to come across while 
executing a valid warrant.46 Others make a case-by-case assessment of whether 
a particular warrant authorized investigators to access particular files.47 And in 
a concurrence, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski advocated a more aggressive 
role for magistrate judges, encouraging them to “insist that the government 
forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine” to prevent turning “all warrants for 
digital data into” the reviled “general warrants,” whose use by the British served 
as impetus for including the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.48  
 
 45 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 46 See, e.g., United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 241–42 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the plain view 
doctrine applies to a computer search in which investigators accessed files not covered by the warrant after 
seeing incriminating file names); United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2010) (determining 
that a warrant authorizing a digital search authorizes examination of every file on the target computer); United 
States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092–94 (10th Cir. 2009) (same). 
 47 See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010) (opining that the scope of the plain 
view doctrine in digital searches should be allowed to develop incrementally on a case-by-case basis); United 
States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 1999) (closed computer files were not in plain view even 
though their file names were visible). Professor Kerr also prefers to allow the law of digital searches to develop 
through ex post case-by-case review, though his views on the role of the plain view doctrine have evolved over 
time. He first argued that the plain view doctrine should not apply to computer searches at all, and then 
subsequently disavowed that approach to argue instead that courts should interpret the Fourth Amendment to 
impose a use restriction on non-responsive electronic data. Compare Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital 
World, supra note 22, at 566–82 (arguing that the plain view doctrine simply should not apply to computer 
searches), with Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence, supra note 32, at 17 (arguing that courts should 
interpret the Fourth Amendment to impose a use restriction on non-responsive data). 
 48 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1178 (9th Cir. 2010 (Kozinski, J., 
concurring); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 
(2011) (“The Fourth Amendment was a response to the English Crown’s use of general warrants, which often 
allowed royal officials to search and seize whatever and whomever they pleased . . . .”); Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (describing British use of general warrants to authorize searches and seizures as “the 
immediate evils that prompted the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment”). 
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B. The Magistrates’ Revolt 
The magistrates’ “revolt” was motivated by several magistrates’ perception 
that courts’ responses to the privacy threat posed by digital searches was 
inadequate. The revolt was to prevent government officials from accessing large 
amounts of non-responsive data in the second step of Rule 41’s two-step 
procedure that prompted some magistrate judges to take matters into their own 
hands.49 Some began to include constraints on how the government could 
execute digital searches in the warrants that they issued. These limits took a 
variety of forms. First are limits on the seizure of the hardware itself, with some 
judges insisting that the government justify why it needed, for example, to seize 
multiple computers in a home rather than only the suspect’s office computer.50 
The magistrate would then authorize the seizure of only those devices whose 
collection the government could justify. A second set of limits applied to the 
actual search of the hardware once it had been seized. These include time limits, 
giving investigators a deadline by which the search must be completed;51 
requiring the government to return or destroy records that fell outside the scope 
of the warrant;52 and—perhaps most controversially—including within the 
warrant details of how the data might be searched, such as what type of search 
 
 49 The revolt began in response to requests for warrants for the contents of email accounts, but the 
rationale was extended to warrants of electronic devices and web-based services as well. In re the Search of 
Premises Known as: Three Hotmail Email Accounts: [redacted]@hotmail.com, [redacted]@hotmail.com, 
[redacted]@hotmail.com Belonging to and Seized from [redacted], No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916, 
at *5 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Three Hotmail Email Accounts]. 
 50 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that officials must get pre-
approval from a magistrate to seize computers and search them at a later date). 
 51 See, e.g., United States v. Mutschelknaus, 592 F.3d 826, 828 (8th Cir. 2010) (describing a warrant 
issued by a magistrate judge that provided a sixty-day window to search a seized computer); United States v. 
Brunette, 76 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D. Me. 1999) (search of computer must be finished within thirty days of the 
seizure). 
 52 See In re the Search of Info. Associated with the Facebook Account Identified by the Username 
Aaron.Alexis that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Facebook, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9–10 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(requiring the return or destruction of data to “prevent the government from collecting and keeping indefinitely 
information to which it has no right”); see also, e.g., In re the Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 80 
(D.D.C. 2014) (insisting the “government must specify what will occur” with “data that is seized by the 
government and is outside the scope of the warrant”); In re the Search of Info. Associated with 
[redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 155–56 (D.D.C.) 
[hereinafter In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com], vacated by 13 F. Supp. 3d 157, 
160–64 (D.D.C. 2014) [hereinafter Stored at Premises].  
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protocols,53 investigators may use.54 Examples might include specific key word 
searches, file types (e.g., text files, picture files, video files), metadata, or the 
protocol might include more sophisticated, computer science-based 
methodologies.55 Even when search protocols were not included in the warrant 
itself, some judges required the government to return to the magistrate for 
permission to move forward once it determined what type of search it needed to 
perform.56 Whichever method was employed, the magistrate specified the limits 
in the warrant itself, thereby placing ex ante limits on how investigators carried 
out their search.  
The magistrates were not accused of “revolting,”57 however, until a handful 
of them began actually denying warrant applications in which the government 
failed to propose sufficient (in the magistrates’ view) ex ante limits on the 
search.58 Their overarching concern, laid out in a series of thoughtful opinions, 
 
 53 See Three Hotmail Email Accounts, 2016 WL 1239916, at *2 (defining a search protocol as “a 
document submitted by the government explaining to the Court how it will conduct its search of an individual’s 
[electronically stored information]”); In re the Search of Apple iPhone, IMEI 013888003738427, 31 F. Supp. 
3d 159, 166 (D.D.C. 2014) [hereinafter Apple iPhone] (defining a search protocol as “an explanation of the 
scientific methodology the government will use to separate what is permitted to be seized from what is not”); id. 
(treating different types of searches as accessing different “regions” of an electronic device, necessitating search 
protocols to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement) . 
 54 See, e.g., In re the Search of: 3817 W. West End, First Floor, Chi., Ill., 60621, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 
963 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (insisting that the government submit search protocols prior to executing the search). But 
see In re a Warrant for All Content and Other Info. Associated with the Email Account xxxxxxx@gmail.com 
Maintained at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Gmail 
Account] (declining to impose search protocols but acknowledging magistrates’ power to do so). 
 55 See, e.g., Three Hotmail Email Accounts, 2016 WL 1239916, at *19–24 (suggesting categorical or 
keyword limits, specifying a search protocol, using special masters or filter teams to segregate non-responsive 
evidence, and imposing rules for returning or destroying non-responsive data); In re the Search of Info. 
Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 
(D.D.C. 2014). 
 56 See, e.g., In re the Search of the Premises Known as 1406 N. 2nd Ave., Iron River, Mich. 49935, No. 
2:05-MJ-28, 2006 WL 709036, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 17, 2006) (requiring government to return to the 
magistrate for express permission to search computers after they had been seized). 
 57 The term “magistrates’ revolt” was first coined in the media and later embraced by at least one of the 
magistrate judges who participated. See supra note 16. 
 58 In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 8; In re Applications 
for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Address, Nos. 12-MJ-8119-DJW, 12-MJ-8191-
DJW, 2012 WL 4383917, at *6 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Email Search Warrants I]. Before actually 
denying any warrants, at least one magistrate repeatedly asked the government to submit more limited warrant 
applications and modified several of those applications. See Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 169; In re 
[redacted]@gmail.com, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1101, 1104–5 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re the Search of Info. Associated 
with [redacted]@mac.com, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 9 (“By the Court’s count, it modified approximately twenty search 
and seizure warrants for electronic information in September and December 2013. It will no longer do so. 
Instead, any warrants that do not comport with the requirement of the Fourth Amendment will—like the present 
Application—be denied . . . .”). But see Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 401 (rejecting requirement that 
warrants for electronic searches require detailed ex ante limitations). 
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was the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that “searches deemed necessary 
should be as limited as possible.”59 The requirements that warrants be based on 
probable cause and identify the places to be searched and the things to be seized 
with particularity, they pointed out, are meant to eliminate “the specific evil” of 
the “‘general warrant’ abhorred by the colonists”60 and to limit investigators’ 
discretion.61 In addition, they advocated “greater vigilance” when it came to 
searches of electronically stored information because digital devices and their 
“ability to store and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a single 
place” leads to increased “risk that, given an unrestricted warrant, the 
government will be able to access a plethora of information which it has no 
constitutional foundation to view.”62 The job of a magistrate, as they saw it, was 
 
 59 Email Search Warrants I, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 467 (1971)); see also, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (holding that the particularity 
“requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the 
character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit”); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 
467 (judicial oversight of search warrants is meant “to eliminate altogether searches not based on probable 
cause”). 
 60 Email Search Warrants I, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467); see Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (pointing out that “the Fourth Amendment was the founding 
generation’s response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ . . . of the colonial era,” which permitted indiscriminate 
searches); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (“It is familiar history that indiscriminate searches 
and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the 
framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”).  
 61 Three Hotmail Email Accounts, No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 
2016); see also, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1989) (“An essential purpose 
of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that 
such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents.”); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
653–54 (1979) (“The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 
‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government officials . . . ‘to safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.’” (citation omitted)); Email Search Warrants I, 2012 WL 
4383917, at *6 (“[N]othing is to be left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” (quoting Marron 
v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927))); Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s 
“Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 316–17 (2016) (“It has long been a 
common consensus that the Fourth Amendment guards against the evil of arbitrary government rummaging in 
people’s lives.”); M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief that Gave It 
Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 921 (2010) (“[T]he mischief that gave birth to the Fourth Amendment was the 
oppressive general search . . . . The lesson from this mischief is that granting unlimited discretion to [government 
officials] inevitably leads to incursions on privacy and liberty . . . .”). 
 62 Email Search Warrants I, 2012 WL 4383917, at *7 (quoting United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 
1132 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted)); Cellular Tels., No. 14-MJ-8017-DJW, 2014 WL 7793690, at *5 (D. 
Kan. Dec. 30, 2014); see also In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 
6 (“Any search of an electronic source has the potential to unearth tens or hundreds of thousands of individual 
documents, pictures, movies, or other constitutionally protected content.” (citing United States v. Leary, 846 
F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988))). 
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to ensure that “the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications”63 rather 
than becoming “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”64  
The magistrates thus began rejecting government applications for warrants 
when those warrants “fail[ed] to set out any limits on the government’s review” 
of the data, “on the universe of information to be disclosed to and searched by 
the government,” or on “the government’s review of the content”65 as well as 
when they viewed the limits the government did propose as inadequate.66 The 
most frequent ground for denying applications was a lack of sufficiently detailed 
search protocols.67 Because while the ability to copy and store “thousands or 
millions of documents with relative ease” means that “the potential for abuse 
has never been greater,”68 search tools provide “the potential for narrowing 
searches so that they are more likely to find only the material within the scope 
of the warrant.”69 Thus, judges saw search protocols as the best available means 
of circumscribing digital searches and expected the government to take 
advantage of them. Opinions denying warrant applications often included 
affirmative suggestions for methods that the government could employ to 
address these concerns70 as well as evidence of “exasperation” with the 
government for not affirmatively suggesting limits itself.71 And while “not every 
 
 63 Email Search Warrants I, 2012 WL 4383917, at *6. 
 64 Id. at *5 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467). 
 65 In re Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Address, Nos. 12-MJ-8119-DJW, 12-
MJ-8191-DJW, 2012 WL 4383917, at *25 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013); id. at *28, *30. 
 66 In re the Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet, Serial No. 4707213703415, in Custody of U.S. Postal 
Inspection Serv., 1400 N.Y. Ave. NW, Wash., D.C., 28 F. Supp. 3d 40, 46 (D.D.C. 2014) (requiring the 
government to submit a search protocol “with sufficient information such that it will not be authorizing the 
general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings that the Fourth Amendment prohibits”) (citation 
omitted); Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 161 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying application because “the government 
fails to articulate how it will limit the possibility that data outside the scope of the warrant will be searched”); In 
re the Search of Premises Known as Nextel Cellular Tel. with Search Warrant [redacted] (Unknown Assigned 
Tel. No.) Belonging to and Seized from [redacted], No. 14-MJ-8005-DJW, 2014 WL 2898262, at *14 (D. Kan. 
June 26, 2014) [hereinafter Nextel Cellular] (“[T]he government must provide the court with a search 
methodology substantially more detailed than the one provided here.”). 
 67 See, e.g., In re the Search of: 3817 W. W. End, First Floor, Chi., Ill., 60621, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 963 
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (requiring government to submit to magistrate judge for review a proposed search protocol 
before issuing a warrant to search the contents of a computer). 
 68 Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 167. 
 69 Id. 
 70 In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at Premises Controlled 
by Apple, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7–8 (D.D.C. 2014); Cellular Tels., No. 14-MJ-8017-DJW, 2014 WL 7793690, 
at *19–23 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 2014) (discussing various possibilities in some detail); Email Search Warrants I, 
Nos. 12-MJ-8119-DJW, 12-MJ-8191-DJW, 2012 WL 4383917, at *10 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012). 
 71 In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com, 13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 154 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(noting “exasperation that the government has, despite repeated warnings,” failed to offer alternatives to its 
overbroad warrant applications); Three Hotmail Email Accounts, No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916, at 
*24 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2016).  
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search is created equal and not every warrant must include search protocols to 
comply with the Fourth Amendment,” the inclusion of a search protocol helps 
the court determine if the “search and seizure requested will be governed by 
sufficient boundaries.”72 
Despite their good-faith effort to solve an acknowledged tension in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, magistrate judges’ so-called revolt has not been 
universally embraced. Indeed, their demands for detailed search protocols were 
often overruled,73 and no court has held that such protocols are required.74 At 
the same time, some courts have expressed support for the idea of including ex 
ante search limits in warrants.75 Judge Kozinski, meanwhile, was the lone voice 
going beyond endorsement to enumerate a set of proposed rules for judges to 
include in warrants to search electronic data.76 Commentators, like courts, have 
split on the issue.77 
 
 72 Cellular Tels., 2014 WL 7793690, at *7. 
 73 See, e.g., Stored at Premises, 13 F. Supp. 3d 157, 159–60 (D.D.C. 2014) (vacating a magistrate judge’s 
opinion requiring the government to submit to ex ante limits). 
 74 E.g., United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir. 2017) (requiring only that warrants for 
computer searches include some limiting principle (quoting United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1165 (10th 
Cir. 2013)); United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 451 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e do not impose any rigid 
requirements [that warrants include specific search protocols] at this juncture.”); Stored at Premises, 13 F. Supp. 
3d at 157; see also Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 21, at 1277–81. 
 75 E.g., United States v. Cartier, 543 F.3d 442, 447–48 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here may be times that a 
search methodology or strategy may be useful or necessary.”); United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 
2006) (noting that the absence of search protocols is not “fatal” to a warrant, but that the court “look[s] favorably 
upon” their inclusion); United States v. Garcia-Alvarez, No. 14-cr-0621 JM, 2015 WL 777411, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 
Feb. 24, 2015) (observing that “it may have been better if the warrant had included a search protocol that 
minimized unnecessary intrusion”); In re Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1170 (Vt. 
2012) (holding that ex ante limits on warrant executions are not required, but are “sometimes acceptable 
mechanisms for ensuring the particularity of a search”). 
 76 United States. v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (stating that judges issuing such warrants should “insist that the government forswear 
reliance on the plain view doctrine,” so that just because investigators come across data on a computer while 
executing a valid warrant, that data cannot itself be seized; “the magistrate judge should order that the seizable 
and non-seizable data be separated by an independent third party under the supervision of the court,” such as a 
computer specialist; the methods the government uses to search for responsive information “must be designed 
to uncover only the information for which it has probable cause, and only that information may be examined by 
the case agents,” and to the extent there remains a risk that agents involved in the investigation might examine 
or retain “any data other than that for which probable cause is shown,” the warrant should include “a protocol 
for preventing” that from happening; absent judicial authorization to the contrary, the government must destroy 
or return non-responsive data). 
 77 Compare, e.g., Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 21, at 1246 (arguing that ex ante warrant 
restrictions are “unauthorized and unwise”), with, e.g., Ohm, supra note 18, at 11–12 (arguing that ex ante 
warrant restrictions are necessary to prevent government overreaching), and Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra 
note 21, at 1245 n.14 (listing articles that, contrary to his view, favor restrictions). 
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The contention of this Article is that what has been labeled a “magistrates’ 
revolt” was actually no such thing. Instead, magistrate judges simply turned to a 
time-honored means of addressing privacy threats posed by broad collection 
authority: minimization.78 The history of minimization procedures—and 
particularly the FISA Court’s implementation of them—reveals not only that 
they provide an excellent means of constraining digital searches but also that 
what some magistrates have been doing—and have been criticized or overruled 
for—is simply borrowing the tool that Congress has statutorily demanded the 
FISA Court use for decades. This Article therefore turns now to a discussion of 
minimization itself. 
II. MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES: CONGRESS’S RESPONSE TO INEVITABLE 
OVER-COLLECTION 
While not a product of the digital age, the idea of minimization was 
nonetheless invented to address the very same concern raised by digital searches: 
how to prevent privacy intrusions when the government executes a warrant that 
will inevitably collect information beyond the scope of the authorized seizure.79 
This Part first traces, in section A, minimization’s development from a judicially 
required element of Congress’s criminal wiretapping statute to its prominent role 
in the implementation of FISA.80 Section B then documents how minimization 
has been employed in practice.81 As this discussion will demonstrate, 
minimization procedures have played a relatively minor role in the regulation of 
criminal investigations, but the FISA Court’s use of them has been both 
innovative and effective.  
 
 78 At least two magistrate judges explicitly recognized that what they were doing was minimization. See 
In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, 
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2014); Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (describing 
as “minimization procedures” privacy protections required in In re the Search of Info. Associated with the 
Facebook Account Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Facebook, 
Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9–10 (D.D.C. 2013)). 
 79 See William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 1633, 1647 (2010) (explaining that in each context that it applies, the role of minimization is “to protect 
against the acquisition[, retention, and dissemination] of private information unrelated to the purpose of the 
criminal investigation”). 
 80 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1813 (2012). 
 81 For a more detailed discussion of the origin and evolution of minimization procedures, particularly in 
the foreign intelligence context, see generally Berman, Quasi-Constitutional Protections, supra note 31, from 
which much of the discussion in this part is drawn. 
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A. The Origins of Minimization Procedures 
By the mid-twentieth century, a technological advancement in fighting 
crime—wiretaps—had become “indispensable” to effective law enforcement, 
particularly against organized crime.82 The technique’s novelty, however, meant 
that legal principles governing its use were initially unclear.83 The Supreme 
Court stepped in to lay down some rules of the road in two 1967 cases. First, in 
Berger v. New York, the Court struck down New York State’s wiretapping law 
as unconstitutional because it permitted collection that was too indiscriminate.84 
The problem, according to the Court, was that New York’s law permitted 
wiretaps that could capture not only a suspect’s communications, but also “the 
conversations of any and all persons coming into the area covered by the device 
. . . without regard to their connection with the crime under investigation.”85 
Berger then “laid out guidelines for the Congress and State legislatures to follow 
in enacting wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping statutes which would meet 
constitutional requirements.”86 Katz v. United States clarified that even wiretaps 
of public phone booths were searches subject to these same Fourth Amendment 
limitations.87 
Guided by the Berger and Katz opinions, Congress drafted what would 
ultimately become Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968 (Title III), which governs the use of wiretaps in federal criminal 
investigations.88 Title III, “tailored to meet the constitutional requirements 
imposed by” the Supreme Court,89 contained a variety of procedural safeguards. 
 
 82 S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 11 (1968) (Title III findings); see also THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW 
ENF’T & THE ADMIN. OF JUST., THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201 (1967) (New York County’s 
District Attorney “testified that electronic surveillance is[] ‘the single most valuable weapon in law 
enforcement’s fight against organized crime’”). 
 83 THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON L. ENF’T & THE ADMIN. OF JUST., THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE 
SOCIETY 94 (“The state of the law in this field is so thoroughly confused that no policeman, except in States that 
forbid both practices totally, can be sure about what he is allowed to do.”); see also id. at 202 (suggesting that 
Congress enact legislation regulating wiretapping). 
 84 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44, 58–59 (1967).  
 85 Id. at 59. 
 86 S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 68 (1968). 
 87 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 88 Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2525 (2012)); S. REP. 
NO. 90-1097, at 75 (“[T]he subcommittee has used the Berger and Katz decisions as a guide in drafting title 
III.”); see also id. at 28 (“This proposed legislation conforms to the constitutional standards set out in Berger v. 
New York . . . and Katz v. United States . . . .”). 
 89 S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 224 (views of Sens. Dirksen, Hruska, Scott, Thurmond, and others); see also, 
e.g., United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that minimization is a necessary part 
of ensuring the constitutionality of surveillance); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 740 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) 
(noting that some circuit courts have held that minimization is a “constitutionally significant” element of Title 
III). 
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These of course included the traditional Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirements: a neutral magistrate must determine that there is probable cause 
to wiretap the target, and the type of evidence officials expect to collect must be 
identified with particularity.90 Congress also inferred from the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, however, the need for an additional procedural protection: 
minimization.91 Specifically, Title III requires that every wiretap order “shall 
contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be . . . conducted in 
such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise 
subject to interception.”92 
In practice, this requires government investigators to take steps to screen out 
conversations that are not pertinent to the investigation. The most 
straightforward way to do so is to monitor the wiretap constantly and record only 
those conversations whose collection is authorized.93 So when the target of the 
investigation is on the phone with his co-conspirators, that conversation should 
be recorded, but when the same facility is used for unrelated conversations, 
authorities should decline to collect those communications. There are other 
methods as well, such as recording only during the hours of the day when the 
target is likely to be discussing criminal activity, or recording all conversations 
and then deleting those that turn out to be non-pertinent.94 
Ten years after Title III was enacted, when Congress again considered the 
regulation of electronic surveillance—this time in the context of foreign 
 
 90 See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979). 
 91 See Bynum v. United States, 423 U.S. 952, 952 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari) (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 68); see also id. (“Together [the provisions of Title III] are intended 
to meet the test of the Constitution that electronic surveillance techniques be used only under the most precise 
and discriminate circumstances.”); Scott v. United States, 425 U.S. 917, 917 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari) (quoting Bynum, 423 U.S. at 952). 
 92 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2012) (emphasis added). Berger requires “[l]imitations on the officer executing 
the eavesdrop order which would (a) prevent his searching unauthorized areas, and (b) prevent further searching 
once the property sought is found.” S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 74; see also id. at 74–75 (noting Katz’s observation 
that the surveillance at issue in that case would have been constitutionally valid had the government gotten a 
judicial order, at least in part because “the agents confined their surveillance to the brief periods during which 
petitioner used the telephone booth and took great care to overhear only the conversations of the petitioner 
himself”). 
 93 See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 15.4 (3d ed. 
2007 & Supp. 2017) (explaining that “intrinsic minimization consists of attempting to screen out non-pertinent 
conversations as each conversation is taking place”). 
 94 See id. § 15.5 (“Extrinsic minimization involves limiting the time period during which monitoring is 
conducted.”); id. § 15.6 (explaining that dual recorder minimization records on two devices at once—on one 
machine, investigators endeavor to listen only to pertinent conversations while on the other they record every 
conversation in full to be used only for the purpose of rebutting charges they have deleted exculpatory remarks); 
id. § 15.7 (explaining that after-the-fact minimization takes place when every conversation is recorded, but only 
pertinent conversations are transcribed or re-recorded and the original tapes are sealed away).  
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intelligence collection—legislators once again turned to minimization 
procedures to safeguard privacy. Like Title III, FISA95—which sets out the rules 
for the conduct of electronic surveillance inside the United States for foreign 
intelligence purposes—includes procedural safeguards, such as minimization 
procedures,96 that reflect Congress’s understanding of what protections were 
necessary to render FISA constitutional.97 
FISA minimization procedures were more expansive, however, than those 
included in Title III.98 Like searches of electronically stored information, foreign 
intelligence collection is also difficult to limit meaningfully at the collection 
stage. As Congress and the courts pointed out, “it may not be possible to avoid 
acquiring all conversations” from a targeted phone line, rather than only those 
relevant to the court order.99 The intercepted communications will sometimes be 
in code or in a foreign language for which there is no translator present,100 and 
sometimes the complexity of the investigation will make it difficult at the 
moment of collection to discern the foreign intelligence value of any given piece 
 
 95 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1813 (2012). 
 96 S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 39 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4008; see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-1283, at 54 (1978). Then-Attorney General Griffin Bell agreed that, “the American people need the 
imposition of minimization standards” because there had been “too much dissemination . . . due to carelessness 
or without thinking.” Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 1566 Before the S. 
Subcomm. on Intelligence & the Rights of Ams. of the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 24 (1977). 
 97 S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 13, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3982 (The legislation “embodies a 
legislative judgment that court orders and other procedural safeguards are necessary to insure that electronic 
surveillance by the U.S. Government within this country conforms to the fundamental principles of the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment.”); see, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984) (“FISA reflects both 
Congress’s ‘legislative judgment’ that the court orders and other procedural safeguards laid out in [FISA] ‘are 
necessary to insure that electronic surveillance . . . conforms to the fundamental principles of the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment.’”), superseded by Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 271 
(2001), as recognized in United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010); Laura K. Donohue, 
Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
117, 220 (2015) (“FISA was Congress’s express decision to curb executive power as a constitutional matter.”). 
This understanding came, at least in part, from a 1972 Supreme Court decision rejecting the executive branch’s 
long-term practice of warrantless wiretapping, which held that the Constitution did not permit electronic 
surveillance of domestic security threats absent ex ante judicial approval. See also United States v. U.S. D. for 
E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 320–23 (1972) (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534–35 (1967)) [hereinafter 
Keith].  
 98 Keith recognized that the procedural safeguards necessary for the conduct of foreign intelligence need 
not be identical to those used for criminal investigations. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322 (“We recognize that domestic 
security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of ‘ordinary 
crime.’ . . . Given these potential distinctions[,] . . . Congress may wish to consider protective standards for 
[intelligence surveillance] which differ from those” in Title III).  
 99 S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 38 (1977). 
 100 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 740–41 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
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of information.101 As a result, FISA’s minimization requirements applied not 
only to the collection of electronic communications, but also to the retention and 
dissemination of that information.102 In other words, recognizing the 
inevitability of collecting communications entirely unrelated to the FISA-
approved investigation, Congress determined that minimization must also limit 
how the government may use the information it collects.103 Thus FISA 
minimization procedures are defined as “specific procedures . . . that are 
reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular 
surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the 
dissemination” of private information about Americans.104 When subsequent 
statutes further expanded foreign intelligence collection, those statutes also 
required all three forms of minimization.105 
In both Title III and FISA, Congress entrusted the judge issuing a warrant or 
surveillance order with determining what minimization requires in any given 
instance. Congress envisioned a strong and continuing role for judges in 
overseeing both the procedures themselves and the government’s compliance 
with them. Under Title III, judges may insist that the government provide 
periodic reports updating the judge on “what progress has been made toward 
achievement of the authorized objective.”106 FISA is even clearer on this point, 
authorizing the judge, at any time, to “assess compliance with the minimization 
procedures by reviewing the circumstances under which information . . . was 
 
 101 Id. 
 102 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012) (providing that minimization procedures must be “reasonably designed in 
light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance [or physical search], to minimize the acquisition 
and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of non-publicly available information concerning unconsenting 
United States persons”); see also DAVID S. KRIS & DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS 
AND PROSECUTIONS § 9:1.50 (2016) (explaining that minimization procedures “require the government to 
‘minimize’ the amount of irrelevant information that it acquires, retains, and disseminates”). The definition of 
minimization requirements for electronic surveillance are codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012); for physical 
searches at 50 U.S.C. § 1821(4) (2012); and for access to tangible things at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)(1) (2012). All 
of these provisions direct the Attorney General to promulgate detailed minimization procedures. 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1801(h), 1821(4), 1861(g)(1). 
 103 S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 17 (1978) (arguing that FISA would “provide adequate protection for 
Americans” by “strengthen[ing] the ‘minimization’ requirements to limit strictly the dissemination of 
information about U.S. persons”); see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 1566 
Before the S. Subcomm. on Intelligence & the Rights of Ams. of the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 
220 (1977) (“[M]inimization procedures are a vital part of the bill because they regulate the acquisition, 
retention, and most importantly, the dissemination of information about U.S. persons” “inadvertently swept up” 
by FISA.).  
 104 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1). 
 105 See infra Section II.B.2. 
 106 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (2012). 
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acquired, retained, or disseminated.”107 Moreover, a FISA judge “has the 
discretionary power to modify the order sought, such as with regard to . . . the 
minimization procedures,” must “monitor compliance with the minimization 
procedures” it imposes, and may treat non-compliance with the minimization 
procedures as contempt of court.108 Congress clearly determined that courts are 
the institutions best suited to assess minimization needs and to oversee their 
implementation.109 
B. The Implementation of Minimization Procedures 
This section will explore the various ways in which judges have employed 
minimization procedures to address privacy concerns, first in the traditional 
criminal context and then in various forms of foreign intelligence surveillance. 
In practice they have played a much larger role in shaping FISA surveillance 
than they have in shaping criminal investigations.110 
1. Minimization in Criminal Investigations 
There are several methods that investigators may use to observe Title III’s 
requirement that wiretaps be “conducted in such a way as to minimize the 
interception”111 of non-pertinent conversations.112 In practice, however, if 
Supreme Court cases are any indication, the directive to minimize criminal 
wiretaps is often more honored in the breach. In Scott v. United States, the 
Supreme Court held that wiretapping does not necessarily violate Title III or the 
Fourth Amendment even if law enforcement officers “fail to make a good-faith 
effort” to comply with the minimization requirement.113 Then in United States 
 
 107 50 U.S.C. § 1805(d)(3) (2012). 
 108 S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 47, 49 (1977). 
 109 Id. at 48; see also S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 57 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1720, at 29 (1978) (“[A]t the 
end of the period of time for which an electronic surveillance was approved . . . the judge may assess compliance 
with the minimization procedures.”); see also 125 Cong. Rec. 10900 (Apr. 20, 1978) (statement of Sen. Evan 
Bayh II, in support of an amendment, later adopted, clarifying the judiciary’s power to oversee the 
implementation of minimization procedures); Helene E. Schwartz, Oversight of Minimization Compliance 
Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: How the Watchdogs are Doing Their Jobs, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 
405, 439 (1981) (emphasizing the FISA Court’s independent role in assessing the sufficiency of minimization 
procedures). 
 110 Note that Congress has expanded minimization in the foreign intelligence context to apply to other 
forms of collection as well. 50 U.S.C. § 1822 (2012) (physical searches); 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012) (pen registers 
and trap-and-trace devices); 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (business records and other tangible things); 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1881a (2012) (communications of non-U.S. persons outside the United States).  
 111 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2012).  
 112 See supra notes 93–94.  
 113 436 U.S. 128, 130 (1978) (instructing courts to assess whether failure to minimize was reasonable “in 
light of the facts and circumstances” investigators faced).  
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v. Kahn, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement officials need not 
minimize crime-related conversations even if the conversation’s participants 
were not the individual(s) identified in the warrant as a person “whose 
communications are to be intercepted.”114 
In light of Scott and Kahn, the role of minimization procedures has been 
relatively minimal in the Title III context. Rather than imposing meaningful 
checks on the government’s exercise of power as Congress intended, “the 
minimization provision plays at best a diminished role in protecting privacy of 
those being investigated.”115 As an example, in Bynum v. United States, Justice 
Brennan dissented from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari to review the 
Second Circuit’s determination that investigators met minimization 
requirements when they intercepted seventy-one calls by the defendant’s 
teenage babysitter, “who was totally innocent of any knowledge of her 
employer’s criminal enterprise.”116  
2. Minimization in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance  
Edward Snowden’s massive leak of intelligence information in the summer 
of 2013, along with documents the government declassified in response, ended 
the decades-long obscurity that FISA minimization procedures had enjoyed. A 
close look at the orders issued by the FISA Court over the past fifteen years 
reveals resourceful use of minimization procedures as bulwarks against threats 
to individual privacy rights.117 Through creativity and assertive exercise of the 
oversight power both inherent in the judiciary and statutorily conferred on the 
FISA Court, FISA judges were able to cabin some of the broadest government 
information-collection authority ever exercised.  
FISA minimization procedures are much more conspicuous than their Title 
III counterparts because they apply to retention and dissemination as well as 
collection.118 Variables such as which type of intelligence collection is at issue, 
which agencies are involved, and the nature of the target all will impact what 
minimization requires. Each agency that handles foreign intelligence develops 
its own standard minimization procedures tailored to that agency’s mission and 
authority.119 In many cases, the standard procedures are sufficient, but FISA 
 
 114 415 U.S. 143, 152 (1974). 
 115 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 93, at § 15:8.  
 116 423 U.S. 952, 954 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 117 See Berman, Quasi-Constitutional Protections, supra note 31, at 790–817. 
 118 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 740 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 119 See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 102, at § 9:3 (“Shortly after FISA’s enactment, ‘standard minimization 
procedures’ were created for various kinds of electronic surveillances . . . .”); FBI, STANDARD MINIMIZATION 
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judges can—and do—sometimes tailor the procedures to address issues arising 
in a particular circumstance.120 
What follows is a discussion of how minimization procedures manifest in 
various forms of foreign intelligence surveillance. It begins with so-called 
traditional FISA, the common label for the surveillance mechanism set up in the 
original FISA statute in 1978. It then turns to two surveillance programs 
authorized by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. And finally, it examines the 
minimization procedures imposed on two metadata collection programs based 
on a provision of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
a. “Traditional” FISA 
Under traditional FISA surveillance of electronic communications—i.e., 
FISA as it was enacted in 1978—minimization tends to take place at the 
retention and dissemination stage, as Congress anticipated.121 Retention 
minimization happens after the information is reduced to an “intelligible form” 
by decoding, translating, or otherwise rendering collected information 
readable.122 If “the information seized is or might be foreign intelligence 
information,” the reviewing agent will log that information “into the FBI’s 
records and [file it] in a variety of storage systems from which it can be retrieved 
for analysis.”123 If, on the other hand, she finds that the information “could not 
be foreign intelligence information or are not evidence of a crime,” she will 
minimize by discarding, erasing, destroying, or (more often) not including the 
information in the indexing log.124 As for dissemination, the agency in 
 
PROCEDURES FOR FBI ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND PHYSICAL SEARCH CONDUCTED UNDER THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 4 (2008) (setting out the FBI’s standard minimization procedures). FISA 
requires the Attorney General to promulgate “specific procedures” for minimization that will be filed with the 
FISA Court for every individual target. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1). 
 120 Schwartz, supra note 109, at 416 (citing interviews with executive branch officials); Banks, supra note 
79, at 1659–60 (“[T]he court may modify the procedures and order that the modified procedures be followed if 
it finds that the [government’s] proposed procedures do not satisfy the FISA definition.”); KRIS & WILSON, supra 
note 102, at § 9:3. 
 121 Note that FISA authorizes electronic surveillance, physical searches, the collection of tangible things, 
and the collection of data from pen registers and trap-and-trace devices. With minimal exceptions, minimization 
is defined in the same way for each of these forms of collection. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1805, 1881a (2012). 
Unlike the provisions governing electronic surveillance and physical searches, the definition of the minimization 
of tangible things does not include collection minimization at all. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)(2) (2012). 
 122 In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surv. Ct, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 617–18 (FISA 
Ct. 2002). 
 123 Id. at 618.  
 124 Id.; Schwartz, supra note 109, at 411 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 56 (1978)) (Transcripts of a 
suspected spy’s wife’s “conversations might be retained for a reasonable period until it could be determined 
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possession of the information may disseminate it only after all U.S. persons’ 
names and personal identifiers are redacted.125  
b. The FISA Amendments Act: PRISM 
The FISA Court has also overseen electronic surveillance under statutory 
provisions enacted more recently—especially sections of the USA PATRIOT 
Act126 and the FISA Amendments Act (FAA).127 FAA collection is sometimes 
referred to as “Section 702” collection, for the section of the FAA that codified 
the power. When using Section 702 authority, the National Security Agency 
(NSA) used the code word “PRISM” when it collected a target’s electronic 
communications from their communications service provider.128 By contrast, 
when the government acquired a target’s communications by capturing the 
information directly from the Internet “backbone” as it transits the web, it is 
known as “upstream” collection.129 It is in the context of these new programs 
that the FISA Court began to get creative with the use of minimization as a 
constitutional stop-gap.  
The new type of minimization procedures that the FISA Court imposed on 
the PRISM program was a response to the ways in which the FAA collection 
authority differed from traditional FISA authority. As an initial matter, the 
definition of who may be targeted is much more capacious under the FAA. 
While traditional FISA requires probable cause that the target is an agent of a 
foreign power, the FAA requires only that the target is a non-U.S. person 
“reasonably believed to be outside the United States” and that the collection is 
undertaken for foreign intelligence purposes.130 This means the bar the 
government must clear to engage in FAA surveillance is far lower than it had 
been before—it represented a significant expansion of the government’s 
collection authority.  
 
whether she too was culpable,” after which, if she were uninvolved, the information would be “destroyed or 
reduced to an essentially non-usable form.”). 
 125 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 102, at § 9:7. The statute creates an exception for this restriction when 
“such person’s identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance” or 
is evidence of a crime. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(2), 1821(4)(B); In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 618. 
 126 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272–73 (2001). 
 127 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 
Stat. 2436, 2438 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012)).  
 128 E.g., James Bamford, They Know Much More than You Think, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 15, 2013 
(describing PRISM as giving the NSA access to data from individual companies). 
 129 Id. (quoting NSA slide describing upstream collection as a “collection of communications on fiber 
cables and infrastructure as data flows past”).  
 130 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2). 
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At the same time, the FISA judge’s role in choosing those overseas targets 
was far more circumscribed under the FAA. Traditional FISA surveillance 
requires a FISA judge to assess ex ante the validity of each surveillance target.131 
This requires the judge to determine, among other things, that there is probable 
cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power and that the proposed 
minimization procedures are sufficient.132 In other words, as with Title III 
warrants, each target must be individually approved by an Article III judge. 
Section 702 surveillance, by contrast, allows the executive branch itself to select 
targets. The government must establish rules governing how targets will be 
selected,133 and the FISA Court must agree that those targeting rules are 
sufficiently likely to identify only non-U.S. persons outside the United States.134 
Once the rules are approved, however, the FISA Court has no role in assessing 
the propriety of individual surveillance targets.135 The same process applies to 
minimization procedures—the government must submit to the FISA Court 
proposed minimization procedures for its approval,136 but the court has no role 
in calibrating them on a target-by-target basis.137 Once the FISA Court approves 
the government’s general minimization procedures, the government follows a 
one-size-fits-all approach that simply applies these pre-approved procedures to 
all Section 702 surveillance.  
The FISA Court responded to this simultaneous expansion of surveillance 
authority and constriction of the scope of judicial review by adding new 
safeguards to the minimization procedures it approved. They go beyond 
traditional FISA practices of simply indexing only the information that might 
qualify as foreign intelligence and determining which communications may be 
disseminated under what circumstances. Section 702’s PRISM minimization 
rules include, for example, guidelines governing what to do when an agency 
discovers that, contrary to statutory requirements, a target turns out to be either 
 
 131 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)–(b) (2012). 
 132 Id. § 1805(a)(3)–(4). 
 133 See ERIC H. HOLDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (2011). 
 134 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2). Some argue that this difference renders the regime unconstitutional. See 
generally Donohue, supra note 97, at 134 (“The incidental collection of large quantities of U.S. persons’ 
international communications, the scanning of content for information ‘about’ non-U.S. person targets, and the 
interception of non-relevant and entirely domestic communications in multi-communication transactions . . . fall 
outside the reasonableness component of the Fourth Amendment.”). A challenge to the constitutionality of the 
FAA was dismissed for lack of standing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013). 
 135 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (granting the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, rather 
than a FISA court, the authority to jointly authorize surveillance of individuals). 
 136 See ERIC H. HOLDER, supra note 133.  
 137 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2). 
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a U.S. person or inside the United States.138 They include limits on who may 
access Section 702-acquired information and what records of that access the 
government must maintain.139 They impose requirements for tagging stored 
information as FAA-acquired and removing identifying information for U.S. 
persons from that information.140 They place limits on the use of “sensitive 
information”—defined as information consisting of religious academic, 
political, or highly personal activities as well as medical information and 
information about minors141—and instruct the government how to handle 
information that falls within the attorney-client privilege or provides evidence 
of a crime.142 This non-exhaustive list gives a sense of the nature of the 
minimization required. Thus recognizing that the more permissive collection 
rules that governed PRISM collection risked more over-collection than 
traditional FISA, and lacking the ability to oversee each decision regarding who 
to target, the FISA Court enlisted a more fulsome regulatory regime regarding 
the use and dissemination of PRISM information to account for Americans’ 
privacy interests.  
c. The FISA Amendments Act: “Upstream” Collection 
The FISA Court’s oversight of Section 702 upstream collection provides an 
even more vivid example of minimization’s potential. Due to technological 
constraints related to how information transits the Internet, Section 702 upstream 
collection of electronic communications directly from the Internet backbone was 
necessarily overbroad.143 It was inescapable that upstream collection was 
capturing some unpredictable—though not negligible—number of entirely 
 
 138 E.g., LORETTA E. LYNCH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 4 (2016). 
 139 E.g., id. at 6–8. 
 140 E.g., id. at 9.  
 141 E.g., id. at 10. 
 142 Id. at 12–13. 
 143 PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT ON THE 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FISA 6 (2014) [hereinafter PCLOB 
SECTION 702 REPORT] (noting that collection could not be limited to communications to and/or from a specific 
target but would also capture any communications “concerning” the target); id. at 39 (explaining that information 
moves across the Internet in the form of “transactions,” which are bundles of data, and some—known as 
multiple-communications transactions (MCTs)—contain within them multiple discrete communications); 
[REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], at 31 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (explaining that the NSA’s upstream 
Internet collection devices cannot distinguish MCTs from transactions containing only a single discrete 
communication). Nor can the NSA “identify the parties to any particular communication within a transaction” 
prior to collection. Id. at 43. The NSA discontinued “about” collection in April 2017. Charlie Savage, N.S.A 
Halts Collection of Americans’ Emails About Foreign Targets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/04/28/us/politics/nsa-surveillance-terrorism-privacy.html. 
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domestic communications unrelated to any surveillance target.144 Personal 
communications of U.S. persons who were not valid targets were inevitably 
being acquired in the process. 
To satisfy itself that upstream’s inevitable over-collection was 
constitutional, the FISA Court once again relied upon an expanded menu of 
minimization procedures, specifically at the retention stage. In a 2011 opinion, 
the FISA Court determined that—despite its overbroad nature—upstream 
collection did not require additional minimization rules because it was already 
as narrowly targeted as technology permitted.145 But because that targeting could 
only be so narrow, it was all the more important for the NSA’s retention 
minimization to adequately minimize information “not relevant to the authorized 
purpose of the acquisition”—i.e., wholly domestic communications.146 In this, 
the FISA Court found, the upstream retention procedures were insufficient.  
The FISA judge’s means of addressing this concern demonstrates one 
method by which the government and a judge with ongoing oversight authority 
can craft case-specific ways to limit privacy intrusions in even in the most 
technologically complex collection contexts. The FISA judge suggested and the 
government adopted a series of additional retention minimization procedures 
that were tailored specifically to challenges posed by upstream collection. These 
additional procedures restricted access to databases most likely to contain 
wholly domestic communications; required domestic communications to be 
purged from the system when identified as such; provided that information 
collected through the upstream program would be permanently tagged with that 
status in government databases, alerting users to the fact that the data is 
particularly sensitive; and limited retention of upstream-acquired information to 
two years, rather than the PRISM standard of five years.147 In light of these 
additional safeguards, the Court subsequently determined that the program was 
statutorily and constitutionally sound.148  
 
 144 [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], at 32–36 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011); PCLOB SECTION 702 
REPORT, supra note 143, at 121 (“[N]o one knows how many wholly domestic communications the NSA may 
be acquiring each year.”). 
 145 [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], at 47–48 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011). 
 146 Id. at 59–61, 78 (NSA’s minimization procedures enhanced “the risk of error, overretention, and 
dissemination of non-target information, including information protected by the Fourth Amendment”). 
 147 [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], at 7–11 (FISA Ct. Nov. 30, 2011). 
 148 Id. at 14. 
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d. Metadata Collection 
Two communications metadata collection programs—one that collected 
Internet metadata and another that collected telephony metadata—provide the 
most dramatic example of minimization’s ability to compensate for overbroad 
collection.149 The first program used an expansive interpretation of FISA’s 
provision authorizing the use of a pen register or trap-and-trace device (pen/trap) 
to acquire Internet metadata about Americans’ electronic communications, such 
as email routing and addressing information.150 The second program used a 
similarly aggressive interpretation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,151 
to collect all domestic and international telephony metadata—information such 
as telephone numbers dialed and the date, time, and duration of the call.152 These 
programs had no targeting rules at all. Instead, the NSA collected everyone’s 
data and then queried the resulting databases using phone numbers or email 
addresses associated with known terrorists in an effort to determine who might 
be in contact with them.153 
The FISA Court acknowledged that its approval of these programs permitted 
the government to engage in an “exceptionally broad form of collection” in 
which “only a very small percentage” of the information collected would be 
“directly relevant” to an investigation.154 Such over-collection was necessary 
because, according to the FISA Court, “the subset of terrorist communications 
is ultimately contained within the whole of the metadata produced, but can only 
be found after the production is aggregated and then queried . . . [so] the whole 
production is relevant to the ongoing investigation out of necessity.”155 
 
 149 Both programs have been discontinued. Brian Bennett, The NSA Will Stop Collecting U.S. Phone Data. 
Now What?, L.A. TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nsa-phone-data-
20150603-story.html; PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 143, at 38; OFFS. OF INSPECTORS GEN’L OF THE 
DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIA, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY & OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., 
UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 29 (July 10, 2009). But see Charlie 
Savage, N.Y. TIMES, File Says N.S.A. Found Way to Replace Email Program (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/11/20/us/politics/records-show-email-analysis-continued-after-nsa-program-ended.html 
(reporting that the NSA found a “functional equivalent” for the program overseas). 
 150 Pen registers record outgoing communication information, such as the numbers called from a particular 
phone; trap-and-trace devices record information about incoming communications. See 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012) 
(foreign intelligence investigations); 18 U.S.C. § 3127 (2012) (criminal investigations). 
 151 See In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, at 9 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). 
 152 Id. at 2 n.2. 
 153 PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 143, at 41, 48. 
 154 [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], at 23, 48 (FISA Ct. July 14, 2004) [hereinafter FISC’s 
Pen/Trap Opinion]. 
 155 In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, at 22 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).  
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Recognizing that the “raw volume of the proposed collection is enormous” and 
that the programs authorized the government to acquire “[metadata] pertaining 
to communications of U.S. persons located within the United States who are not 
the subject of any FBI investigation,”156 the Court concluded that the program 
“carries with it a heightened risk that collected information could be subject to 
various forms of misuse.”157 Due to the enormity of the inevitable over-
collection, the FISA Court in this context relied again on program-specific 
minimization procedures to limit the impact on Americans’ privacy. 
For our purposes, it is important to note that the FISA Court determined that 
the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the collection in either of these 
programs, and only the telephony metadata collection had statutory 
minimization requirements.158 Nevertheless, because the programs represented 
“an extraordinarily broad implementation of a type of surveillance that Congress 
has regulated by statute, even in its conventional, more narrowly targeted 
form,”159 the Court deemed strict procedural protections necessary even where 
no statutory or constitutional mandate existed.160 When Congress enacted the 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, the culmination of the public debate sparked by 
Edward Snowden’s 2013 leak, it endorsed the FISA Court’s actions in this 
regard.161 The primary purpose of the legislation was to strengthen privacy rights 
in the context of metadata collection. To accomplish this goal, Congress codified 
both the majority of the minimization procedures, described below, that the 
 
 156 Id. at 39 (quoting government application). 
 157 Id. at 68. 
 158 Because both programs collected only metadata, the government and the FISA Court deemed the 
Fourth Amendment inapplicable based on the third party doctrine, which states that the Fourth Amendment does 
not regulate government collection of information you have voluntarily provided to a third party, such as your 
phone records. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (no Fourth Amendment protection for 
phone call metadata); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (no Fourth Amendment protection for 
bank records). Section 215 did include a statutory mandate to minimize. But since minimization procedures need 
only be “reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique” of collection under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g), it 
is likely that minimization procedures for non-content, non-Fourth Amendment-protected information like 
telephony metadata need not be particularly stringent.  
 159 FISC’s Pen/Trap Opinion, at 69, 80–87 (FISA Ct. July 14, 2004).  
 160 Unlike upstream collection of communications content under Section 702 of the FAA and some 
business records orders issued under Section 215, pen/trap devices will never collect anything other than 
communications metadata—i.e., non-content information that is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. See 
supra text accompanying note 158 (explaining third party doctrine). This likely explains the lack of minimization 
requirement in this provision at the time. 
 161 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 104(a)(3), 129 Stat. 268, 272 (2015) (to be 
codified at 50 U.S.C. 1861(c)(1)). 
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FISA judges had insisted upon162 and the FISA Court’s conclusion that all 
communications metadata collection must be subject to minimization.163  
The restrictions the FISA Court imposed on the metadata collection 
programs were both procedural and substantive.164 Many of the procedural 
protections resembled those previously imposed on Section 702-acquired data: 
access to the metadata databases was limited to authorized analysts by requiring 
a user name and password, records of which would be maintained for auditing 
purposes;165 all queries of the databases containing the information collected 
under these programs had to be approved by one of a limited number of senior 
officials;166 and that information would only be available for a limited time.167 
The order also included a ninety-day limit on the length of the authorized 
surveillance.168 When applying for reauthorization at the end of each ninety-day 
period, the FISA Court required the government to include a report discussing 
the queries that had been made since the previous application and describing any 
proposed changes.169  
Other minimization rules were substantive and entirely novel: First, the 
Court imposed a Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) standard on database 
queries, which required the government to conclude prior to running a query 
regarding any specific search term that, “based on the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, 
there are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that a particular 
known [redacted—probably email or IP address] is associated with [redacted—
probably international terrorist organization or Al Qaeda].”170 This requirement 
served to limit government access to Internet or communications metadata to 
individuals about whom the government had individualized reasons to suspect 
involvement in international terrorism. Much in the way a warrant requires the 
government to demonstrate probable cause before engaging in a search, the RAS 
 
 162 Id. § 101(b)(3), 129 Stat. at 270 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)). 
 163 See id. § 202(a), 129 Stat. at 277–78 (requiring “privacy procedures” when employing pen/trap 
devices) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1842(h)). 
 164 E.g., Memorandum of Law and Fact in Support of Application for Pen Registers and Trap and Trace 
Devices for Foreign Intelligence Purposes at 3, [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. 2004); 
FISC’s Pen/Trap Opinion, at 69–70. 
 165 FISC’s Pen/Trap Opinion, at 83. 
 166 Id. at 84. 
 167 Id. at 85–86. 
 168 Id. at 80. 
 169 Id. at 86–87. 
 170 Id. at 57. 
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standard limited the government’s access to this vast trove of information to 
instances in which there was objective evidence that justified doing so.171 
The FISA Court also imposed limits on the type of analysis to which the 
information could be subjected, and modified the minimization procedures 
imposed on these bulk collection programs over time to address concerns that 
arose in the course of their implementation.172 Finally, unable to monitor the 
government’s implementation of these rules on a daily basis, the FISA Court 
assigned that role to the NSA Office of General Counsel.173 That office had to 
ensure that analysts with access to the metadata received adequate training, 
monitor compliance with the RAS standard, and review the legal adequacy of 
the basis of any query about a U.S. person’s account.174 As with the Section 702 
upstream program, the court’s authority to impose, modify, and oversee 
compliance with minimization procedures empowered it to confine the privacy 
risks presented by these programs whose very design included over-broad 
collection. 
Minimization procedures can therefore serve to constrain government power 
in contexts where technological change has resulted in inevitable over-
collection. Indeed, they can supply necessary protections even in the absence of 
statutory requirements. The next Part considers the implications of this lesson 
beyond the FISA context. 
 
 171 See Berman, Quasi-Constitutional Protections, supra note 31, at Section III.A. (arguing that the FISA 
Court’s minimization procedures for the bulk metadata collection programs were stand-ins for the traditional 
warrant requirements of an ex ante showing of probable case and particularity). 
 172 After the government informed the FISA Court in 2009 of a number of instances of government non-
compliance, the FISA Court imposed additional minimization requirements: the Justice Department had to 
review a sample of the NSA’s justifications for querying data once every ninety days, twice every ninety days 
the NSA’s Office of General Counsel (subsequently substituted with the Justice Department’s National Security 
Division) conducted random spot checks, In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 06-05, at 8, 10 (FISA Ct. Aug. 18, 2006), 
and the NSA had to submit periodic reports to the FISA Court regarding the queries it had conducted and the 
information it had disseminated. Order Regarding Further Compliance Incidents, In re Application of the Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-
13, at 3 (FISA Ct. Sept. 25, 2009); In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring 
the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-06, at 7 (FISA Ct. June 26, 2009).  
 173 FISC’s Pen/Trap Opinion, at 84–85 (FISA Ct. July 14, 2004); Order Regarding Further Compliance 
Incidents, In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-13, at 3 (FISA Ct. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 174 FISC’s Pen/Trap Opinion, at 84. 
BERMAN_GALLEYPROOFS 9/26/2018 10:01 AM 
82 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:49 
III. MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES: MITIGATING PRIVACY CONCERNS IN 
DIGITAL SEARCHES 
This Part makes the case that magistrate judges should employ minimization 
procedures to mitigate Fourth Amendment concerns in digital searches. As noted 
above, some magistrate judges have, in fact, been including in their warrants ex 
ante limits on the parameters of digital searches, though almost never actually 
referring to them as “minimization procedures.”175 Section A will explain the 
benefits of both adopting the minimization label and embracing the use of the 
tool. Section B will then address the policy-based objections to this practice and 
argue that ex ante minimization requirements are, in fact, a superior means of 
addressing the concerns raised by digital searches than reliance on ex post 
judicial review. Finally, section C will make the case that, despite the absence 
of a statutory mandate, magistrate judges do in fact have the authority to impose 
these requirements.  
A. Minimization’s Untapped Potential  
Adopting the “minimization” label for magistrate judges’ ex ante search 
instructions would yield several benefits. First, it would recognize that digital 
searches present a problem for which the law already has generated a solution. 
As the FISA Court’s experience demonstrates, minimization procedures can 
address Fourth Amendment concerns that arise when a particular investigative 
technique risks significant over-collection.176 Recall that the original purpose of 
FISA minimization was to force the government to segregate evidence that it 
was authorized to collect from other, Fourth Amendment-protected 
information.177 The mechanism Congress and the Supreme Court settled on for 
this task was to expand the concept of minimization from its origins as a means 
of preventing over-collection—through wiretap-collection minimization—to 
address circumstances when over-collection is unavoidable—through retention, 
use, and dissemination minimization.178  
 
 175 There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 451 (2d Cir. 2013); Gmail 
Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re the Search of Info. Associated with 
[redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 176 Note that not everyone considers FISA minimization an unparalleled success. Some argue that some 
of the government’s surveillance programs, like Section 702 for example, are simply unconstitutional on their 
face. To those holding this view, minimization procedures might be seen as an effort to put a Band-Aid on a 
gaping wound, providing the appearance, but not the substance, of constitutional constraints. See, e.g., Donohue, 
supra note 97, at 124.  
 177 See supra Section II.A. 
 178 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967); 
Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012)). 
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Digital searches present a conceptually analogous problem to the one posed 
by FISA surveillance in that, as Rule 41’s two-step process recognizes, it is often 
not possible at the point of collection to limit the seizure of digital evidence to 
material covered by the warrant. The challenge therefore, as with FISA 
surveillance, is to devise a way to limit post-collection privacy intrusions. In 
imposing ex ante limits, magistrate judges recognized how technological 
innovation had given rise to this same problem in a new context and simply 
applied to that new context a proven, accepted technique of safeguarding 
constitutional rights.179 The fact that most magistrates did not consciously 
invoke the idea of minimization to justify ex ante limitations on searches does 
nothing to undermine the force of this argument. Whether consciously or 
unconsciously, these judges saw the need to impose post-collection privacy 
safeguards and implemented them.180 Embracing the term “minimization” thus 
recasts what some have characterized as a “revolt” into merely the 
implementation of a long-standing, battle-tested privacy-protection tool.  
Second, characterizing magistrates’ practice of imposing ex ante limits as 
minimization procedures highlights the effectiveness of the practice. As 
discussed in Part II, FISA judges were able to develop minimization strategies 
that accounted for privacy concerns while still permitting the government to 
pursue its desired counterterrorism and counterintelligence policies, even as 
those policies expanded in scope. For technological reasons stemming from the 
nature of Internet traffic, the requirements of sophisticated data analysis, and the 
difficulty in pinpointing the location of particular individuals and electronic 
devices, several FISA surveillance programs implemented in the decade after 
9/11 presented Fourth Amendment challenges.181 The FISA Court, charged with 
ensuring that these programs comported with constitutional requirements, had 
two options. It could simply have denied the government authority to engage in 
the type of collection it sought despite that collection’s national security value. 
Or it could find a way to curtail the privacy threat those programs posed. 
Minimization thus served to protect individual privacy rights while 
acknowledging the government’s investigative needs. Moreover, these strategies 
were able to adapt as technology—and the government’s surveillance programs 
themselves—grew and changed.  
 
 179 See, e.g., supra cases cited in notes 51–56. 
 180 See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 140 (2d Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 
824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 181 See, e.g., [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], at 31 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT: Q&A 2 (2017) (describing the impact of technological change on 
government surveillance authorities), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/faa-fact.pdf. 
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To be sure, minimization did not eliminate all privacy threats, and it 
increased the administrative burden on the government. But the Fourth 
Amendment does not deal in absolutes. As the Supreme Court repeatedly 
reminds us, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and 
whether a search or seizure is reasonable ultimately rests on whether it 
successfully balances the government’s interest against those of individuals.182 
The FISA Court’s jurisprudence provides an example of how minimization 
empowers courts with tools they can use to calibrate this balance. 
Third, pointing to the parallel between minimization and magistrates’ ex ante 
requirements illustrates the critical role judges play in addressing case-specific 
privacy concerns. There are no particular procedures that are inherently part of 
“minimization” as a concept. Rather, minimization is any set of procedures 
“reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique” of information 
collection “to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the 
dissemination,” of information whose collection is not authorized.183 Consider 
the modification of minimization rules undertaken to shore up the privacy 
protections of Section 702 upstream collection.184 Those procedures were 
tailored very specifically to that form of collection and its unique challenges. 
Recognizing that it was impossible for the NSA to avoid the acquisition of some 
domestic U.S. person communications, the FISA judge in that case focused on 
how modifications to retention rules might ameliorate privacy concerns.185 And 
in developing those enhanced retention rules, the judge took into account the 
structure of the databases containing Section 702-acquired information as well 
as the NSA’s internal procedures for handling the raw intelligence.186 Magistrate 
judges can exhibit similar flexibility in their efforts to tailor ex ante rules in ways 
that enable the government to successfully locate digital contraband without 
exceeding constitutional limits.  
Indeed, the FISA Court’s experience demonstrates how judges and the 
government can form an effective team for designing ways to meet the needs of 
both privacy and effective investigation. Recognizing the legitimacy of the 
judges’ ongoing oversight authority encourages a partnership, rather than an 
 
 182 E.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (“The general touchstone 
of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis . . . governs the method of execution of the 
warrant.”). 
 183 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2012). 
 184 See supra Section II.B.2.  
 185 [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], at 59–61, 78 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011). 
 186 Id. 
BERMAN_GALLEYPROOFS 9/26/2018 10:01 AM 
2018] THE MAGISTRATES’ REVOLT 85 
adversarial relationship, between the government and the court. There were 
multiple FISA-related instances where the government only discovered 
technical limitations or systemic (though inadvertent) non-compliance due to its 
obligations to report back to the FISA Court periodically, which provided the 
court with the opportunity to adjust the applicable minimization procedures.187 
Viewing ex ante restrictions on digital searches as minimization procedures 
allows judges to assume this role and empowers them to craft, along with the 
government, a set of rules for each search that both protects Fourth Amendment 
interests and recognizes the government’s investigative needs. 
Fourth and finally, explicitly adopting minimization procedures as the means 
of regulating digital searches will draw both the government and magistrates’ 
attention to the wealth of specific, innovative examples that the FISA Court’s 
jurisprudence provides. Recall the broad range of requirements that the FISA 
Court developed to facilitate judicial oversight of surveillance programs. FISA 
Court orders dictated what information could be retained and under what 
circumstances.188 They restricted who could access certain information and what 
sort of internal executive branch oversight was necessary. They required 
periodic reports on how orders were implemented.189 They limited what type of 
analysis the government could employ on data garnered through bulk collection 
programs—i.e., search protocols. They imposed substantive standards that the 
government had to meet before accessing information it had collected. 
Magistrate judges imposing minimization procedures could employ some of 
these methods, or they might feel empowered to follow in the FISA Court’s 
footsteps and devise their own additional context-specific measures where 
appropriate. They could require supervisory oversight of search procedures. 
They could insist that the government provide audit logs indicating exactly what 
kinds of analysis it performed. They could adopt traditional FISA’s common 
means of acquisition minimization by barring investigators from documenting 
non-responsive material, thus making it more difficult to access in the future. 
The list is endless and infinitely malleable, allowing courts to adapt not only to 
each investigation but also as technology changes. This is a powerful tool to 
have available when the pace of technological change means that minimization 
needs will evolve over time, as both criminals and government agencies continue 
to exploit the latest digital tools. 
 
 187 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 188 See supra Section II.B.2. 
 189 See supra Section II.B.2.d. 
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B. The Advantages of Ex Ante Minimization Over Ex Post Judicial Review 
Despite the benefits of embracing minimization procedures in both name and 
substance, the government and some commentators have expressed resistance to 
the idea that magistrate judges should be taking on this role as a policy matter. 
Professor Orin Kerr argues, for example, that rather than imposing ex ante limits, 
magistrates should allow the rules regarding digital searches to develop through 
ex post judicial review.190 This would mean that magistrates would simply issue 
warrants, law enforcement would execute those warrants, and judges would 
assess the constitutionality of that execution if and when a criminal defendant 
moved for the court to suppress the fruits of the search. Ex post review is 
preferable, opponents of ex ante minimization rules argue, for three reasons: 
first, permitting magistrates to impose ex ante limits will impose unnecessary 
restrictions on government searches;191 second, magistrates and prosecutors lack 
the ability to predict search needs;192 and finally, the use of ex ante instructions 
will impede higher courts’ development of Fourth Amendment requirements 
when it comes to computer searches.193 
With respect to the concern that ex ante limits place constraints on 
government investigators that are too strict and thereby impede effective 
investigations, there are at least two responses. First, if the government begins 
to execute a warrant and determines that it needs broader searching capabilities 
or an extension of time limits, there is nothing that prevents returning to the 
magistrate for a modification of the existing warrant or applying for a new 
warrant. Indeed, when investigators executing a warrant authorizing a search for 
evidence of drug trafficking found evidence of child pornography as well, the 
Tenth Circuit held that upon first discovering child pornography, they should 
have applied for a second warrant before seeking out additional evidence of child 
pornography.194 Second, courts imposing ex ante limits do not do so to dictate 
how searches will be executed. Instead, they seek “a sophisticated technical 
 
 190 See Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 21, at 1278–80. 
 191 See Three Hotmail Email Accounts, No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916, at *16 (D. Kan. Mar. 
28, 2016) (describing objections) (citing In re Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1171 
(Vt. 2012)). 
 192 See Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Our inability to predict the best 
mechanism for conducting a search strongly counsels against including any search protocol in a warrant.”); Kerr, 
Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 21, at 1281–84.  
 193 See Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 21, at 1278–90. These drawbacks, in his view, outweigh the 
benefits of addressing the current legal uncertainty. Id. 
 194 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1274–76 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Turner, 169 
F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (suppressing evidence of child pornography that officers found by opening JPEG 
files on a computer in a home they were searching for physical evidence of assault). 
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explanation of how the government intends to conduct the search so that the 
Court may conclude that the government is making a genuine effort to limit itself 
to a particularized search.”195 In other words, the issuing court is not imposing 
its own limits so much as ensuring that the government has a plan to impose 
constraints on itself. 
Objections based on magistrates’ ability to determine in advance what type 
of search is necessary are similarly misplaced. One version of this objection is 
simply based on magistrates’ (and prosecutors’, for that matter) lack of a crystal 
ball; it is impossible to predict in advance what steps investigators will need to 
take to perform an effective search. But again, ex ante limits are neither finite 
nor set in stone. Magistrates’ demands have simply been that the government, 
as part of its warrant application, explain its search plans—how it intends to find 
responsive information, and what it intends to do with information it comes 
across that falls outside the scope of the warrant.196 The content of ex ante limits 
thus comes not from prognostication but rather from a description of the 
government’s plans. 
Opponents also question the magistrates’ ability to assess the government’s 
search needs as a matter of institutional competence. They question, that is, 
whether magistrates have sufficient expertise or knowledge to set out effective 
rules to govern digital searches. Here again, this objection seems to misconstrue 
the magistrates’ actual role. The government does not simply submit an 
application to the magistrate and rely upon him or her to construct from scratch 
a set of rules. Rather—as with the FISA Court—the government’s application 
itself contains proposed limits.197 It is up to the government to determine how it 
will go about its search, so long as it can articulate some constraints on its 
authority.198 And as several magistrates have stressed, the government need not 
 
 195 Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 167–68 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[T]his Court is not requiring a search 
protocol so that it may specify how the warrant is to be executed. Instead, the protocol will explain to the Court 
how the government intends to determine where it will search.”); see also Cellular Tels., No. 14-MJ-8017-DJW, 
2014 WL 7793690, at *10 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 2014); In re the Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet, Serial No. 
4707213703415, in Custody of U.S. Postal Inspection Serv., 1400 N.Y. Ave. NW, Wash., D.C., 28 F. Supp. 3d 
40, 45 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 196 Three Hotmail Email Accounts, 2016 WL 1239916, at *2; id. at *20 (“The government is free to 
determine the best procedure and techniques to use, so long as the government provides notice as to what those 
procedures are.”); see also In re the Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (noting that the 
search protocol “need not be overly detailed—the Court is not asking for a list of search terms—but the overview 
must provide” enough information to assure that court that it would not be authoring a general search). 
 197 See, e.g., Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168. 
 198 See In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com, 13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 153–54 
(D.D.C. 2014) (describing magistrates’ frustration at government’s persistent failure to respond to repeated 
requests that it include search limits in its application). 
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be concerned that its applications will prove too technologically sophisticated 
for magistrates to digest. Instead, “[t]he government should not be afraid to use 
terms like ‘MD5 hash values,’ ‘metadata,’ ‘registry,’ ‘write blocking’ and ‘status 
marker,’ nor should it shy away from explaining what kinds of third party 
software are used and how that software is used to search for particular types of 
data.”199 In other words, magistrates are not holding themselves out as technical 
experts. They are merely asserting the need to be sure that the government’s own 
experts have devised a sufficiently circumscribed protocol. 
Finally, this Part turns to concerns that permitting magistrates to impose ex 
ante rules on searches will prevent case law regarding what qualifies as 
reasonable when it comes to digital searches from developing. Fourth 
Amendment law frequently evolves as a result of ex post review of law 
enforcement activities. That is to say, after government officials execute a search 
or a seizure, that action is subject to judicial review when a criminal defendant 
seeks to suppress the fruits of that search or seizure. Advocates for ex post review 
are concerned that, if magistrate judges regularly impose ex ante rules for 
searches, then higher courts’ review of the lawfulness of a search will be focused 
on whether the government complied with the magistrate’s instructions, rather 
than whether the search itself was reasonable.200 There will therefore be no 
vehicle driving the development of the law regarding what constitutes a 
reasonable search or seizure. 
There are both legal and policy-based responses to this argument. As a legal 
matter, it is important to note that magistrates who have articulated their 
justification for imposing ex ante limits have not identified them as a way to 
ensure that searches are reasonable. Rather, they have imposed those limits to 
satisfy the requirements of probable cause and particularity, without which they 
cannot issue warrants.201 When magistrate judges, for example, have insisted 
that warrants include a particular search protocol, they have done so “not in 
addition to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, but in satisfaction of 
 
 199 Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168. 
 200 See Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 21, at 1287–90. 
 201 E.g., Nextel Cellular, No. 14-MJ-8005-DJW, 2014 WL 2898262, at *10 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014) 
(rejecting application for warrant allowing unlimited search of cell phone contents as authorizing seizure of data 
for which government lacks probable cause and failing to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity 
requirement); In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Accounts/Skype 
Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ-8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-8167-DJW, 
2013 WL 4647554, at *3, *8 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) (rejecting warrant application for not describing the data 
to be seized in a sufficiently particularized fashion); Ohm, supra note 18, at 10 (recognizing that “magistrate 
judge-imposed restrictions on search warrants protect against not only the failure of particularity but also the 
manifest failure of probable cause”). 
BERMAN_GALLEYPROOFS 9/26/2018 10:01 AM 
2018] THE MAGISTRATES’ REVOLT 89 
them.”202 If magistrates are correct that warrants for digital searches that lack 
limitations do not satisfy the probable cause or particularity requirements, then 
evidence uncovered by such searches risks being suppressed at trial for that 
reason. A search executed on the basis of a warrant issued without probable 
cause or sufficient particularity is almost always, by definition, unreasonable. 
As a policy matter, Professor Kerr’s insistence on ex post review is curious 
given his usual recognition of the need for flexibility. In other contexts, he 
argues, for example, that because “the privacy implications of particular rules 
can fluctuate as technology advances,” we need mechanisms that can “adapt to 
technological change.”203 For Kerr, that usually means a preference for 
legislative action over judicial decision-making, because Congress is free to 
experiment and make amendments,204 while Fourth Amendment-based judicial 
decisions enshrine in constitutional law approaches that may become dated.205 
But if flexibility is important, ex ante minimization rules outperform 
legislatures as well as ex post judicial review. Indeed, the NSA has explicitly 
objected to codifying minimization procedures on the grounds that “it can be 
difficult to change a statute if the procedures need to be changed in order to meet 
operational needs.”206 Even if some investigative techniques pose threats to 
privacy and therefore require minimization, there is no rule dictating what the 
minimization procedures must look like. Therefore if a judge determines, for 
example, that the current state of technology demands that investigators employ 
a taint team to limit access to non-responsive information contained in a 
suspect’s cell phone, that limit can be included in a judicial order authorizing the 
search without necessarily imposing that same rule on all cell phone searches 
going forward. If six months later, technology has evolved to mitigate the 
 
 202 Cellular Tels., No. 14-MJ-8017-DJW, 2014 WL 7793690, at *6 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 2014); see also In 
re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (denying government’s 
warrant application to seize all emails from an account because it has shown probable cause only for some of 
the emails in that account). 
 203 See Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 3, at 871–75. 
 204 E.g., id. at 805–806. As Justice Alito pointed out, even if the best solution to privacy concerns arising 
from dramatic technical change are legislative, neither Congress nor most states have enacted statutes regulating, 
for example, the use of GPS tracking technology for law enforcement purposes. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). The same can be said for computer and cell phone searches and the 
use of information contained in law enforcement databases. Others advocate for a more robust judicial role. See, 
e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1752–53 (1995) (arguing that when 
technological changes disrupt the law, the lower courts should wrestle with the difficult questions “to create a 
body of legal material from which others may draw in considering these questions”). 
 205 Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 3, at 805–07, 858 (“[I]t is difficult for 
judges to fashion lasting guidance when technologies are new and rapidly changing.”). 
 206 Banks, supra note 79, at 1664 (quoting NSA’s minimization procedures). 
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privacy threat posed by cell phone searches, judges would be free to impose 
minimization demands that take account of this development.207  
Establishing rules ex ante also benefits the investigators themselves. 
Normally, uncertainty in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is disfavored by law 
enforcement because the absence of clear rules means government officials have 
insufficient guidance regarding how they may lawfully carry out their duties.208 
Often this aversion to uncertainty produces a preference for bright-line 
constitutional rules that make plain what conduct is acceptable.209 Placing ex 
ante rules within the warrant itself means that even in the face of uncertainty 
regarding the constitutional requirements for digital searches, law enforcement 
will know at the outset what is permissible in the execution of any given warrant. 
Of course, a court might subsequently disagree that the minimization procedures 
laid down in a warrant actually were adequate to meet Fourth Amendment 
requirements. However, this is likely to be a rare occurrence.210 Investigators 
following ex ante rules can therefore execute their search confident in their 
future ability to use its fruits as evidence at trial, whereas investigators without 
such guidelines must speculate whether the trial judge will allow the evidence 
to be introduced. Minimization therefore mitigates the usual concern about the 
absence of bright-line rules to guide law enforcement action when the applicable 
law is uncertain. 
There are two additional advantages to encouraging magistrates to use ex 
ante minimization rather than relying on ex post judicial review. The first flows 
from that fact that so many defendants challenging digital searches are charged 
with possession of child pornography. Individuals whose digital devices contain 
such images do not create a sympathetic context in which to consider the 
propriety of a search. Judges are likely—consciously or unconsciously—to seek 
to validate arguably problematic searches because of what they uncover, 
potentially skewing the resulting doctrine in the government’s favor.211 While 
 
 207 See United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 979 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 208 Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 3, at 884 (“[I]n the criminal context 
rule-uncertainty is a liability.”). 
 209 E.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Supreme Court 
“repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case 
definition of Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual circumstances.”); White v. United 
States, 454 U.S. 924, 927 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of certiorari because of 
“uncertainty involv[ing] a fundamental aspect of law enforcement operations” and because “clarification of the 
boundaries of legitimate police activity under the Constitution is ultimately this Court’s responsibility”). 
 210 See Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 21, at 1285–86 (recognizing that evidence within the scope 
of a warrant is hard to suppress unless the warrant is flagrantly disregarded). 
 211 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 802 (1994). 
BERMAN_GALLEYPROOFS 9/26/2018 10:01 AM 
2018] THE MAGISTRATES’ REVOLT 91 
inadvertently rooting out someone with child pornography is not necessarily a 
bad thing, the next time that same search technique is used, it might be on the 
digital storage of someone completely innocent.  
Second, ex ante minimization requirements will prevent the government 
from benefiting from clear constitutional violations due to the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.212 The good-faith exception says that the 
exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained pursuant to 
searches executed in reasonable reliance on a warrant that is ultimately found to 
be invalid.213 It may be the case that post hoc review determines that some 
warrants issued without ex ante instructions in them are invalid—because they 
lack sufficient probable cause or particularity, or because the search they 
authorized was otherwise unreasonable. Unless the warrant’s deficiencies were 
relatively clear to the executing officers at the time the search was conducted, 
however, the government will face no penalty for having invaded a defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights. Ex ante limits have the benefit of preventing 
constitutional violations before they ever take place.214  
Minimization provides the best of all worlds: it ensures privacy protections 
in each search, preserves flexibility while simultaneously offering sufficient 
guidance for law enforcement, and provides judges the freedom to experiment 
and evolve as both technology and investigative techniques develop.215 
Ultimately, if the Supreme Court or Congress determines that rules for these 
searches should be codified more permanently, judges’ use of varying forms of 
minimization and their relative effectiveness also will provide appellate judges 
and policymakers valuable information regarding which tools are most 
effective.216 
C. Magistrate Judges’ Authority to Require Minimization Procedures  
The potential advantages of ex ante regulation can only be exploited if 
judges and magistrates actually have the authority to include minimization rules 
 
 212 In United States v. Ganias, the full Second Circuit applied the good faith exception to the warrant clause 
for a search, 824 F.3d 199, 225–26 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc), reversing the panel’s opinion, which held that the 
search was “a widespread seizure of files beyond the scope of the warrant—conduct that resembled an 
impermissible general search.” United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 140 (2d Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc on 
other grounds, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 213 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–21 (1984). 
 214 See Cellular Tels., No. 14-MJ-8017-DJW, 2014 WL 7793690, at *10 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 2014) (“While 
ex post remedies are aimed at mitigating harm resulting from an unconstitutional search and seizure, ex ante 
restrictions help ensure that no violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights takes place at all.”). 
 215 See supra Section II.B. 
 216 See Lessig, supra note 204, at 1752–53. 
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in search warrants. Again, Professor Kerr is skeptical, arguing that the 
magistrate’s role in crafting warrants is “surprisingly narrow” and does not 
include the kind of ex ante rulemaking authority contemplated here.217 This 
contention rests on the language of the federal search warrant statute, which is 
mirrored by many states, as well as the doctrine emerging from several judicial 
opinions.218 As Professor Ohm effectively refutes Kerr’s doctrinal argument, 
this Article need not repeat his analysis in detail here.219 Having examined the 
sources on which Kerr relies, however, he concludes that while it is true that the 
Supreme Court has never required ex ante limits, neither has it forbidden 
them.220  
As for the textual argument, Kerr opines that Rule 41’s requirement “that 
judges must issue warrants when investigators” establish probable cause means 
that judges have no “authority to condition issuance of a warrant on its 
execution.”221 To be sure, Rule 41 does include that compulsory language. As 
an initial matter, this argument only has force if law enforcement’s showing of 
probable cause is valid in the absence of ex ante instructions.222 Even if there is 
no question as to the sufficiency of the probable cause showing, however, 
nothing in the rule imposes any restrictions on including content in the warrant 
above and beyond the mandatory elements.223 At the same time, Rule 41 does 
specify that warrants for electronically stored information are assumed to 
authorize “a later review of the media or information consistent with the 
warrant.”224 Rule 41’s requirement that a later review of electronic media be 
“consistent with the warrant” arguably contemplates a warrant that not only 
 
 217 See Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 21, at 1261. 
 218 United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97–98 (2006) (anticipatory warrants need not include a particular 
description of the triggering condition to be valid); Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 328 (1979) (holding 
that the magistrate’s participation in the execution of the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, and arguably 
construing magistrates’ roles narrowly); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979) (holding that warrants 
need not include a specification of the precise manner in which they are going to be executed). 
 219 See Ohm, supra note 18, at 2–11 (arguing that Kerr’s analysis errs, inter alia, in evaluating the use of 
ex ante search limits under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement rather than viewing such limits 
as a means of satisfying the requirements of probable cause and particularity). 
 220 Id.; see also Ferguson, supra note 6.  
 221 Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 21, at 1271 (emphasis added); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1) (“After 
receiving an affidavit or other information, a [judge] . . . must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to 
search for and seize a person or property . . . .”). 
 222 See supra notes 201–202 (pointing out that some magistrates have included ex ante rules as a means 
of satisfying probable cause requirements, because only by following those rules will law enforcement’s access 
be limited to material for which they have probable cause). 
 223 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A) (listing as mandatory requirements that all warrants command law 
enforcement to execute the warrant within two weeks, during the daytime, and return the warrant once it has 
been executed). 
 224 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
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authorizes the search but also includes terms with which the government must 
act consistently. There is nothing to say that these terms may not include specific 
limitations on how the government executes the search.  
Indeed, magistrates regularly include such limitations outside the digital 
context,225 and magistrate judges already are explicitly authorized in Rule 41 to 
specify a deadline by which the warrant must be executed, to dictate whether the 
warrant may be executed at night, and to require any unlawful property 
deprivation be remedied.226 Additional minimization procedures are not a 
significant departure from such measures.  
Finally, recall the FISA Court’s treatment of the Internet metadata collection 
program. The orders approving that program included exceedingly detailed, 
rigorous minimization procedures.227 Yet neither the Constitution nor the 
relevant statute required minimization of that information at the time. This 
implies that the judicial power includes some discretion regarding whether and 
when the government should be subject to privacy-related constraints. In any 
event, if judges currently do lack this power, Rule 41 could easily be amended 
to include a provision mirroring FISA’s language specifically delegating to 
issuing judges the power to devise, require, and oversee minimization 
procedures.  
CONCLUSION 
Minimization procedures have always straddled the divide between statutory 
and constitutional territory. They almost always derive from statutory demands, 
but Congress uses them in legislation to allay concerns about the 
constitutionality of over-broad collection. In other words, where they are 
statutorily required, they are there because they are constitutionally necessary. 
This tool, however, can also address the constitutional concerns raised by 
inevitable over-broad collection in circumstances where they are not statutorily 
required. Indeed, minimization presents an elegant solution to a challenge the 
courts currently face. The FISA Court devised a remarkable variety of 
minimization procedures to meet privacy concerns. In so doing, it showed how 
helpful a safeguard minimization can be in situations where narrowly targeted 
collection is technologically challenging. FISA judges also demonstrated the 
benefit of having reviewing judges help to design the limits as part of their ex 
 
 225 See Ohm, supra note 18, at 4 (“Outside the computer context, magistrate judges regularly impose ex 
ante restrictions on search warrants in order to ensure probable cause and particularity.” (italics added)). 
 226 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e), (g). 
 227 See supra Section II.B.2.d. 
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ante oversight of searches and seizures. Judges facing the analogous challenge 
of crafting warrants to search digital storage devices cleverly recognized that the 
tool could address their concerns as well. Rather than accusing magistrates of 
revolting, we should be praising their foresight in importing an existing legal 
mechanism to protect individual privacy while also enabling effective criminal 
investigations.  
 
